Western New England University School of Law

Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law
Faculty Scholarship

Faculty Publications

1992

Codification of Supplemental Jurisdiction:
Anatomy of a Legislative Proposal
Arthur D. Wolf
Western New England University School of Law, awolf@law.wne.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/facschol
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the Legislation Commons
Recommended Citation
14 W. New. Eng. L. Rev. 1 (1992)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications at Digital Commons @ Western New England University School of
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Western New England University
School of Law. For more information, please contact pnewcombe@law.wne.edu.

Volume 14
Issue 1
1992

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND
LAW REVIEW

CODIFICATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL
JURISDICTION: ANATOMY OF A
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
ARTHUR D. WOLF·
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION •................•......•......•.......••....

I.

THE DOCTRINE OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION......

A.

Early Developments ...............................
The Gibbs Era ....................................
Erosion of the Doctrine ............................

6
12

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS. . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . .

15

A. History of Section 120 of House Bill 5381 ..........
B. General Scope of Supplemental Jurisdiction .........
C. Judicial Discretion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16
20

B.
C.

II.

2
3
4

1. Power Provision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Discretionary Dismissal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
a. Criteria for Dismissal .......................
b. Reasons for Dismissal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23
23
24
24
27

• Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; LL.B., Columbia
University, 1965; A.B., Tufts University, 1962.
Professor Wolf served as special counsel to Representative Robert F. Drinan, a member of the House Judiciary Committee, from 1973-78. Together with other consultants, he
also served as an advisor to Representative Robert W. Kastenmeier and the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice during the development of the supplemental jurisdiction statute.
Professor Wolf expresses his deep appreciation to Ms. Panagiota Brotsis who ably
served as his research assistant during the preparation of this Article. Her diligence, insights, perseverance, and good humor made the writing infinitely easier.
Professor Wolf also expresses his gratitude to Ms. Michele Felasco, Class of 1991, for
her research during the early stages of the development of this Article.

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

2

c. Time for Dismissal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Certification...................................
4. Supersession and Removal .....................
Diversity Exception ........ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

27
30

POST-STATUTE DECISIONAL LAW......................

44
49
52
53
55
57
58

D.
III.

[Vol. 14:1

CONCLUSION. . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . .
ApPENDIX A. . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •
ApPENDIX
ApPENDIX

B ................................................
C ................................................

ApPENDIX D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ApPENDIX

E ................................................

32
38

INTRODUCTION

Recent Supreme Court decisions have threatened the vitality of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, collectively known as supplemental
jurisdiction. Under the supplemental jurisdiction doctrine, federal
courts had for many years entertained supplemental claims over which
they would not otherwise have had jurisdiction. Through judicial lawmaking, they had fashioned the doctrine by expansively interpreting
the word "case" in Article III of the United States Constitution. In
1990, to prevent further erosion of supplemental jurisdiction, Congress
enacted legislation that placed the doctrine on a statutory footing.
On December 1, 1990, President Bush approved the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. 1 Title III of that Act, the "Federal Courts
Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990" (hereinafter Implementation Act),2 enacted a number of recommendations contained in
the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee,3 released on April
2, 1990. Section 310 of the Implementation Act codified supplemental
jurisdiction by creating a new section, section 1367 of title 28. 4 This
codification was the first congressional effort to address this subject
comprehensively. On prior occasions, Congress has expressly legislated supplemental jurisdiction in limited areas, the most prominent of
which are: (1) actions involving copyright, plant variety, trademark,
and patent claims;s (2) actions removed from state to federal court;6
1. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (to be codified as amended in scattered
titles of U.S.C.).
2. Id. at 5104.
3. FEDERAL STUDY COMMITTEE, REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE (April & July 1990) [hereinafter STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT].
4. See Appendix A for statutory text.
5. 28 U.S.c. § 1338(b) (1988) provides: "The district courts shall have original juris-
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and (3) bankruptcy cases. 7 In three other areas, the Supreme Court
has interpreted the relevant jurisdictional statutes to prohibit the assertion of some supplemental claims. 8
The historic nature of congressional action in codifying supplemental jurisdiction in section 1367 calls for a close examination of the
legislative process and product. Section I of this Article presents a
brief survey of the development of supplemental jurisdiction. Section
II examines the history of the legislative process that produced section
1367. Section III contains a preliminary review of judicial decisions
under the new supplemental jurisdiction statute. The Article concludes with some editorial remarks regarding the statute and the process by which it became public law.
I.

THE DOCTRINE OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

Current terminology refers to the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction collectively as "incidental" or "supplemental" jurisdiction. The new provision, section 1367, employs the latter phrase,
which courts and commentators appeared to favor prior to the enactdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent,_ plant variety protection or trademark laws." Id.
6. 28 U.S.C. § 144I(c) as amended by the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990
provides:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed
and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may
remand all matters in which State law predominates.
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.)
5089, 5114.
Section 312 of Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act, the Federal Courts Study
Committee Implementation Act of 1990, amended this section to limit its reach to actions
based on the general federal question jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988). See
discussion infra at Section II.C.4.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (1988) provides in relevant part: "[T]he district courts shall
have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceectings arising under title II [the
Bankruptcy Code], or arising in or related to cases under title II." Id. See also
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
8. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) forbids a plaintiff who asserts a claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act from asserting a supplemental
claim against a person who is not already a party to the action); Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978) (28 U.S.C. § 1332 forbids a plaintiff from asserting a
supplemental claim against an impleaded defendant who is not diverse from the plaintift);
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1(1976) (28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) forbids a plaintiff who asserts
a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 from asserting a supplemental claim against a municipality
that is not already a party to the action).
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ment of the new statute. 9 The doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction
permits the federal courts to entertain claims over which they would
not otherwise have jurisdiction. In other words, the supplemental or
non-federal claim does not have an independent basis of jurisdiction.
The federal or jurisdiction-conferring claim could be rooted in anyone
of many federal statutes that give the district courts jurisdiction based
on the nature of the claim (for example, federal question cases) or the
nature of the party (for example, diversity cases). The non-federal
claim that does not have an independent basis of jurisdiction is usually
rooted in state law, although many such claims are based on other
sources, such as foreign law.
The development of the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction
moved through four stages. The first stage encompassed the period
between the decisions of the Supreme Court in Osborn v. Bank of the
United States 10 in 1824 and United Mine. Workers v. Gibbs 11 in 1966.
The second stage began with Gibbs, the landmark case that expanded
the scope of supplemental jurisdiction, and continued until Aldinger v.
Howard l2 in 1976. The third stage commenced with Aldinger, when
the Court started restricting supplemental jurisdiction, and continued
through Finley v. United States 13 in 1989 up to the enactment of section 1367 on December 1, 1990. The fourth stage began with the enactment of section 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction statute. 14
A.

Early Development

Some commentators IS trace the roots of supplemental jurisdiction
to the 1824 decision of the United States Supreme Court in Osborn v.
Bank of the United States .16 Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Mar9. Richard D. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life After
Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 445 (1991) [hereinafter
Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity]; Richard D. Freer, A Principled
Statutory Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE L.J. 34 [hereinafter Freer, A
Principled Statutory Approach]; Richard A. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction
Primer: The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. to3
(1983); Thomas M. Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990
B.Y.U. L. REV. 247. One commentator traces the use of the word "supplemental" as a
jurisdictional concept to equity practice of antiquity. Susan M. Glenn, Note, Federal Supplemental Enforcement Jurisdiction, 42 S.C. L. REV. 469 (1991).
to. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
11. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
12. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
13. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
14. This fourth stage will be discussed in Section III.
15. E.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 5.4.1 (1989); CHARLES
A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 19 (4th ed. 1983).
16. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
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shall observed:
There is scarcely any case, every part of which depends on the constitution, laws or treaties of the United States. . . . If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction, that the title or right set up by the
party, may be defeated by one construction of the constitution or
law of the United States, and sustained by the opposite construction, ... then all the other questions must be decided as incidental
to this, which gives that jurisdiction. 17

The "other questions" to which he referred were matters arising under
state law, the decision of which was both necessary and "incidental"18
to the federal questions. Since nearly every case arising under federal
law would raise non-federal questions, as Marshall noted, the federal
court must have the authority to resolve all of the issues in the case. 19
While the federal courts could have limited the Osborn language
to resolving only state law questions, but not separate, state-based
claims, they did not interpret the words so restrictively. In succeeding
years, the Supreme Court and lower federal courts employed the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction in a wide variety of contexts, permitting the joinder of additional claims and parties even without an
independent basis of jurisdiction. Notwithstanding the requirement of
complete diversity, 20 for example, the Supreme Court permitted persons to intervene as defendants to protect their property interests even
though they were citizens of the same state as the plaintiff. 21 In later
years the Court also permitted defendants to assert, against non-diverse plaintiffs, state-based counterclaims arising out of the same
17. Id. at 820, 822. Even Justice Johnson in dissent agreed. "No one can question,
that the Court which has jurisdiction of the principal question, must exercise jurisdiction
over every question." Id. at 884 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 822. Some authors have used the word "incidental" to describe a unified
doctrine of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. Eg., Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and
Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARv. L. REv. 1935
(1982). The more common phrase is "supplemental jurisdiction," which § 1367 employs.
See supra text accompanying note 9.
19. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 822. Of course, the presence of those "other questions" in the case does not deprive Congress of the power to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts over the federal issues.
[W)hen a question to which the judicial power of the Union is extended by the
constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of Congress to give the [federal] [c]ourts jurisdiction of that cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.
Id. at 823.
20. The requirement of complete diversity, in which each plaintiff must be a citizen
of a different state from each defendant, traces its lineage to Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S.
(3 Cranch) 267 (1806). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 5.3.3.
21. Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861).
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transaction or occurrence that gave rise to the plaintifrs federal
claim. 22 Indeed the Court, relying on supplemental jurisdiction, even
permitted a plaintiff to assert a state law claim against an entity of
state government,23 notwithstanding state sovereign immunity embedded in the Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. 24
In 1933, the Supreme Court sought to restate the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction in Hum v. Oursler. 25 For federal court jurisdictional purposes, the Court distinguished cases in which state and
federal grounds are asserted in .support of a "single cause of action"
from suits where the state and federal bases comprise "two separate
and distinct causes of action. "26 In tying federal jurisdiction over nonfederal claims to the concept of a "single cause of action," the Court
created a rule that was the "source of considerable confusion" in the
lower federal courtS. 27 Many years later the Court recognized that by
the "first third of the 20th century, 'however, the phrase [cause of action] had become so encrusted with doctrinal complexity that the authors of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure eschewed it
altogether."28

B.

The Gibbs Era

In 1938, five years after Hum, the Supreme Court adopted the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which laid the groundwork for a
22. Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
23. Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). However, the
Supreme Court disapproved this use of supplemental jurisdiction in Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), which extended the reach of the Eleventh
Amendment to bar federal court jurisdiction over plaintiff's state law claims against a state
or its entities and officials.
24. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial power of the United States shall
not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
25. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
26. Id. at 246. The Court rejected the notion of defining "cause of action" by its
factual underpinnings for purposes of supplemental jurisdiction. Id. See generally Note,
The Concept of Law-Tied Pendent Jurisdiction: Gibbs and Aldinger Reconsidered, 87
YALE L.J. 627 (1978). At other points in the Hum opinion, however, the Court did make
reference to the claims as "dependent on the same facts," and as resting "upon identical
facts." Hum, 289 U.S. at 244, 246. The attention in Hurn to the facts underlying claims
might have inspired the Court in Gibbs to reformulate supplemental jurisdiction in terms of
a "common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725
(1966).
27. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724.
28. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 237 (1979). Nonetheless, the Court in Davis
continued the use of the phrase "cause of action," which created additional confusion
among civil procedure mavens. Id. at 237, 239 nn.15, 18.
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reformulation of the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. 29 Among
other things, the rules merged law and equity into one civil actioll,3o
provided for liberal joinder of claims and parties,31 and effected other
reforms aimed at litigating all claims aQlorig the disputants in one lawsuit. 32 In 1966, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the modernization of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure· when it reformulated the
doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction.
In the leading case of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 33 the Court
noted the difficulties experienced by the lower federal courts in applying the Hum "cause of action" doctrine. 34 Referring to the rules and
the tendency of its earlier cases to require a plaintiff to join all related
claims in one action, the Court held that jurisdiction, in an Article III
sense, exists if the relationship between the federal and state claims
"permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.' "35 In short, the Court permitted
29. See generally United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
30. FED R. eIV. P. 2. Rule 2 provides: "There shall be one form of action to be
known as 'civil action.''' Id.
31. See id. Rule 18 (joinder of claims and remedies); id. Rule 19 (joinder of persons
needed for just adjudication); id. Rule 20 (permissive joinder of parties); id. Rule 21 (misjoinder and nonjoinder of parties).
32. See id Rule 13 (counterclaim and cross-claim); id. Rule 14 (third-party practice); id. Rule 15 (amended and supplemental pleadings); id. Rule 22 (interpleader); id.
Rule 24 (intervention); id. Rule 42 (consolidation).
33. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
34. Id. at 724.
35. Id. at 725 (footnote omitted). Although the Gibbs opinion is vulnerable on several grounds, perhaps its most obvious tlaw is the Court's reversal of the usual analysis that
addresses statutory issues before examining constitutional ·questions. See generally Michael
Shakman, The New Pendent Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 20 STAN. L. REV. 262
(1968). Prior to determining the scope of the word "case" in Article III, the Gibbs Court
should have studied the jurisdictional statute to determine whether Congress intended to
confer pendent jurisdiction, and in what measure. If the statutory grant reached the state
claim, only then would it have been necessary to decide whether that grant was within the
confines of Article III. See infra notes 42-52 and accompanying text.
One commentator suggested that Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976), may have
undermined Gibbs by requiring that the plaintiff affirmatively show that Congress intended
in the jurisdictional statute to permit the assertion of the particular pendent claim in question. Geoffrey P. Miller, Comment, Aldinger v. Howard and Pendent Jurisdiction, 77
CoLUM. L. REV. 127 (1977). The thrust of Aldinger, as later amplified by the Court in
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978), did not go quite that far.
Rather Aldinger and Kroger appeared to create a presumption in favor of pendent jurisdiction that could be rebutted by a showing that Congress intended to exclude a particular
pendent claim or party from the scope of federal jurisdiction. See generally Ellen S.
Mouchawar, Note, The CongreSSional Resu"ection of Supplemental Jurisdiction in the
Post-Finley Era, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1611, 1624-25 (1991). The Court's subsequent decision
in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), may indeed have gone that far. See infra
notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Finley case.
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the plaintiff to assert both federal and state law claims in one civil
action even though the state claim did not have an independent basis
of jurisdiction.
After surmounting the constitutional objection to a more expansive view of supplemental jurisdiction, the Court in Gibbs articulated
the criteria by which to determine, in any given action, whether the
federal and state claims do indeed constitute "one constitutional
'case.''' With the vagaries of "cause of action" undoubtedly in mind,
the Court adopted a two-pronged test to determine when non-federal
claims (those which do not have an independent basis for federal jurisdiction) may properly be asserted in federal court. 36 First, the federal
claim that provides the independent basis for jurisdiction must have
"substance sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction."37 Second,
the federal and non-federal claims must "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."38
36. Gibbs, 383 u.s. at 725. A lively debate has developed over whether the Gibbs
test is two-pronged or three-pronged. This debate has arisen because Justice Brennan, after
noting the "substantiality" and "common nucleus" factors, added: "But if, considered
without regard to their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that he would
ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues, there is power in federal courts to hear the whole." Id. Three
distinguished commentators, relying on the "ordinarily be expected to try" language, maintain that this element is cumulative to the other two factors, and thus constitutes a third
criteria. 13B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3567.1, at 116 (2d ed. 1984); accord. Norbert J. Bissonette. Note, Pendent Party Jurisdiction: The Demise o/a Doctrine?, 27 DRAKE L. REV. 361,364-65 (1977-78); Mouchawar,
supra note 35, at 1619-21 (referring to this third factor as the "single trial expectancy"
standard).
But other commentators are equally certain that Gibbs announced only a two-pronged
test, with the above quoted sentence serving as an alternative formulation. E.g., Joan
Baker, Toward a Relaxed View 0/ Federal Ancillary and Pendent Jurisdiction, 33 U. PITT.
L. REV. 759,764-65 (1972); accord, William D. Claster, Comment, Pendent and Ancillary
Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis 0/ Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REV. 1263, 1272 (1975).
Still other scholars view the trial expectation language as "surplusage, used only to give
content to the common nucleus test." Matasar, supra note 9, at 139; see also Mengler,
supra note 9, at 274.
The Supreme Court itself has not resolved this ambiguity nor has it acknowledged the
underlying debate. Its recent descriptions of the Gibbs opinion could be read to support
any of these interpretations. See. e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989); Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,349 (1988). In the legislative history accompanying the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Congress adopted a twopronged test, based on its interpretation of the Gibbs case, for the purpose of awarding
attorney fees in actions involving supplemental claims. H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4 n.7 (1976). The federal courts have followed this interpretation of Gibbs in
construing the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act. See generally MARY F.
DERFNER & ARTHUR D. WOLF, COURT AWARDED ArrORNEY FEES ~ 12.03 (1991).
37. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725.
38. Id.
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In 1974, eight years after Gibbs, the Court clarified the first prong
of the test by explaining more precisely what it meant by a claim of
"sufficient substance." In Hagans v. Lavine, 39 the Court held that this
standard required only that the federal claim be one that is not "obviously frivolous," or "absolutely devoid of merit," or "wholly insubstantial."4O The relatively low quantum of "federalness" needed to
satisfy this minimal requirement led Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in
Hagans, to characterize the standard as permitting jurisdiction whenever the "plaintiff is able to plead his claim with a straight face."41
39. 415 U.S. 528 (1974).
40. Id. at 536-37 (citations omitted). When the defendant inoves to dismiss the complaint because the federal question is "insubstantial" or "frivolous," the court, in ruling on
that motion, looks only to the plaintiff's allegations. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
(1970). Thus, the plaintiff need not demonstrate jurisdiction "over the primary claim at all
stages as a prerequisite to resolution of the pendent claim." Id. at 405. This approach is
little more than an application of the "well-pleaded complaint" rule, which the Court has
applied to resolve subject matter jurisdiction questions. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v.
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283 (1938) (jurisdictional amount); Metcalfv. Watertown, 128 U.S.
586 (1888) ("arising under" questions); Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 537 (1824)
(diversity of citizenship). In each of these cases, the Court relied on Osborn v. Bank of the
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), in holding that jurisdiction depends "on the
state of things when the action is brought." Id. at 824. That "after vesting, it cannot be
ousted by subsequent events." Mollan, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 539; cf. Mosher v. City of
Phoenix, 287 U.S. 29, 30 (1932) ("Jurisdiction is thus determined by the allegations of the
[complaint] and not by the way the facts tum out or by a decision of the merits."). The
Court recently reaffirmed this settled rule in Freeport-McMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc.,
III S. Ct. 858, 860 (1991) (per curiam) ("We have consistently held that if jurisdiction
exists at the time an action is commenced, such jurisdiction may not be divested by subsequent events.").
. In view of a provision in the Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, the rule
might have been the other way, that is, that federal court jurisdiction could be "ousted by
subsequent events." Section 5 of the 1875 Act required dismissal of a suit commenced in or
removed to federal court "at any time after such suit has been brought [if the suit] does not
really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction"
of the court. Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (emphasis added); see
generally Gold-Washing & Water Co. v. Keyes, 96 U.S. 199 (1877) (federal court suit may
be dismissed if it later appears that disposition of the case does not depend upon the construction of federal law or the Constitution). Even though that language remained in the
United States Code until 1948, when it was removed "as unnecessary," the Supreme Court
nonetheless adhered to the "well-pleaded complaint" rule through those years. HENRY M.
HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
1705 (3d ed. 1988). The Supreme Court has also held, however, that other jurisdictional
attacks, such as the absence of a justiciable controversy (e.g., standing to sue or mootness),
remain open throughout the litigation and are subject to later developments. E.g., County
of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979) (mootness).
41. Hagans, 415 U.S. at 564 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Because Justice Rehnquist
thought the jurisdiction-conferring constitutional claim was so weak and insubstantial, he
quipped that "this seems to be a classic case of the statutory tail wagging the constitutional
dog." Id. Indeed some of the earlier precedents required that the federal question be "real
and substantial," which seemed to impose something more than the minimal test of Hagans. McCain v. Des Moines, 174 U.S. 168, 181 (1899). The formulation in McCain de-

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

10

[Vol. 14: 1

One of the puzzling points in Gibbs was its placing the doctrine of
supplemental jurisdiction on Article III grounds, without regard to
any jurisdictional statute. Both before and after Gibbs, the Supreme
Court referred to the doctrine as judicially created. 42 In Murphy v.
John Hofman CO.,43 a pre-Gibbs decision, the Court held:
Where a court of competent jurisdiction has taken property into its
possession, through its officers, the property is thereby withdrawn
from the jurisdiction of all other courts. The court having possession of the property, has an ancillary jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions respecting the title, possession or control of the
property. In the courts of the United States this ancillary jurisdiction may be exercised, though it is not authorized by any statute. 44

In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,4s a post-Gibbs
decision, the Court noted that "pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made
doctrine inferred from the general language 9f Article 111."46 Later in
the same opinion, Justice Powell observed that "pendent jurisdiction is
a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived from the
general Article III language conferring power to hear all 'cases' arising
under federal law or between' diverse parties. "47
rived from the general federal question jurisdictional statute, enacted in 1875, which
authorized the federal trial courts to dismiss an original suit or remand a removed suit to
the state court if "it shall appear to the satisfaction of said [federal] court, at any time after
such suit has been brought or removed thereto, that such suit does not really and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the jurisdiction of said [federal]
court." Judiciary Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 5, 18 Stat. 470, 472 (emphasis added). Although
this provision was omitted from the 1948 recodification of the Judicial Code "as unnecessary," the federal courts continued to apply the substantiality test after 1948. HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 1705 (quoting from the legislative history of the recodification). Perhaps that omission underlays Justice Harlan's observation that the standard is "a
maxim more ancient than analytically sound." Rosado v. Wyman, ,397 U.S. 397, 404
(1970).

42. See generally Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural Common
Law. Federal Jurisdictional Policy. and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent
State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291 (1986) (exploring the concept of judicially created rules of jurisdiction in a broader context).
43. 211 U.S. 562 (1909). The Court's holding in Murphy derived from its earlier
decision in Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861).
44. Murphy, 211 U.S. at 569 (emphasis added). The newly enacted § 1367 combines
"ancillary jurisdiction" with "pendent jurisdiction" to form "supplemental jurisdiction."
28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (West Supp. 1991). See Appendix A.
45. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
46. Id. at 117.
47. Id. at 120. In relying on "the general Article III language" as the basis for
supplemental jurisdiction, the Court has not drawn any distinction between "cases" and
"controversies," the critical words in Article III. Arguably "cases" could have a narrower
meaning than "controversies" since "cases" are tied to federal sources of law, while "controversies" refer to disputes involving designated parties. Thus, an Article III "case" ar-
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In judicially creating supplemental jurisdiction and placing it on
Article III grounds, the Supreme Court altered the usual jurisdictional
analysis it has articulated through the years in two significant respects.
First, the Court has insisted that lower federal courts address nonconstitutional state or federal grounds of decision before addressing
constitutional questions. 48 In Burton v. United States,49 the Court
stated that "[i]t is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a
constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the
case."SO If the jurisdictional statute in Gi~bs (the Taft-Hartley Act)
did not authorize supplemental jurisdiction, then the Court did not
have to address the scope of a "constitutional case" in Article III.Sl
The Court never addressed this statutory question.
Second, the Court has long stated that the jurisdiction of the federal courts, including the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court,S2 is governed by statute. In 1799, the Court stated that "[t]he
political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (except in a
few specified instances) belongs to congress, ... [and] congress is not
bound . . . to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal Courts, to every
subject, in every form, which the constitution might warrant."S3 Almost 150 years ago, the Court held that federal courts "must look to
the statute as the warrant for their authority; certainly they cannot go
guably is only as broad as the federal claim or question' (including the facts or transaction
upon which it is· based) that confers the jurisdiction, while an Article III "cOntroversy"
could include the whole range of claims and questions that are in dispute between designated parties that determine jurisdiction.
Recently, in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989), the Court sought to reconstruct the judicially created doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction upon a statutory footing.
See infra notes 62-66 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Finley case.
48. See, e.g., Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974) (federal statutory ground); Siler
v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909) (state law ground).
49. 196 U.S. 283 (1905).
50. Id. at 295; accord Township of Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620, 629
(1946); Cincinnati v. Vester, 281 U.S. 439, 448-49 (1930).
51. See generally Shakman, supra note 35.
52. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). The Court stated:
The principle that the affirmation of appellate jurisdiction implies the negation of
all such jurisdiction not affirmed having been thus established, it was an almost
necessary consequence that acts of Congress, providing for the exercise of jurisdiction, should come to be spoken of as acts granting jurisdiction, and not as acts
making exceptions to the constitutional grant of it.
Id. at 513.
For the view that the Constitution limits the power of Congress to control the exercise
of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction, see generally Lawrence G. Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal
Courts, 95 HARv. L. REV. 17 (1981). For the status of the current debate between these
two positions, see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 379-87.
53. Turner v. Bank of North Am., 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 n.1 (1799).

12

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1

beyond the statute, and assert an authority with which they may not
be invested by it, or which may be clearly denied to them. "54 In
Gibbs, the Supreme Court ignored the statutory basis for jurisdiction
in the federal courts and moved directly to the scope of an Article III
"case."
In any event, for ten years after the 1966 ruling in Gibbs, the
lower federal courts liberally followed its teachings. In a wide variety
of cases, the district judges permitted litigants to join separate claims
in one lawsuit if they met the Gibbs criteria. 55 Some courts applied the
generous Gibbs test to cases in which new parties were brought into
the litigation. For example, in Revere Copper & Brass Inc. v. Aetna
Casualty & Sur. CO.,56 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
third party defendant in a diversity suit could assert a claim against a
non-diverse plaintiff. 57

c.

Erosion of the Doctrine

In a series of decisions beginning in 1976, however, the Supreme
Court started restricting supplemental jurisdiction. While adhering to
the general contours of Gibbs, the Court held that the broad reach of
Gibbs would be limited where Congress, by statute, has so indicated.
For example, in Aldinger v. Howard,58 the Court held that a plaintiff
may not invoke supplemental jurisdiction to assert a state law claim
against a county government that is not already a party to a lawsuit
based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 59 Similarly, in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,60 the Court held that the plaintiff in a diversity suit
may not invoke supplemental jurisdiction to assert a state law claim
against an impleaded third party defendant if diversity of citizenship
does not exist between them under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.61
The erosion of supplemental jurisdiction continued in Finley v.
United States. 62 In Finley, the Court refused to permit the plaintiff,
suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA),
54. Cary v. Curtis, 44 u.s. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
55. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 36, § 3567.2; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15,
§ 5.4.
56. 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970).
57. Id. at 715-16. Eight years later, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in a
diversity suit could not assert a claim against a non-diverse third party defendant, even
though that defendant could assert a claim against the plaintiff. Owen Equip. & Erection
Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
58. 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
59. Id. at 16-19.
60. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
61. Id. at 373-77.
62. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
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to join a non-diverse entity as a defendant and assert a state law claim
against it. 63 The Court reached this result even though federal jurisdiction is exclusive in flCA cases,64 and even though the federal
courts largely apply state law in such suits. 65 Indeed, in Finley, the
Court appeared to cast doubt on the Gibbs case itself, suggesting that
congressional authorization is necessary, at least where new parties are
joined, before the courts may invoke supplemental jurisdiction. The
Court stated that where existing parties seek to bring new persons into
the lawsuit, it would not presume that supplemental jurisdiction
would extend to the limits of Article 111.66
Following the lead of the Supreme Court in Finley, some lower
federal courts restricted the reach of supplemental jurisdiction. In
Lockard v. Missouri Pacific Railway Co., 67 for example, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a plaintiff may not assert a state
law claim for negligence against a person not already a party to a law
suit arising under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. 68 Similarly,
in Iron Workers Mid-South Pension Fund v. Terotechnology Corp. ,69
the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could not, in the absence of
diversity, assert a claim against a third person, not already in the lawsuit, to enforce a state based property lien in an action arising under
the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974.'0
In contrast, other federal courts were more generous in reading
the Finley opinion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit permitted pendent party claims based on state law in suits grounded in
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.'1 Furthermore, in some cases,
/d. at 554-56.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988) provides that, in FICA cases, "the district courts ...
shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil actions on claims against the United States." Id.
65. Section 1346(b) further provides that the district courts, in FICA cases, shall
apply "the law of the place where the act or omission [giving rise to govemmentalliability]
occurred." Id. With some exceptions, this means that state law ordinarily applies in
FICA cases. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953); cf. Berkovitz v. United
States, 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
66. Finley, 490 U.S. at 549. One could argue that Congress implicitly adopted the
broad Gibbs approach to supplemental jurisdiction in every jurisdictional statute enacted or
amended since the Gibbs decision in 1966. Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375,384-86 (1983), seems to support that theory. In Herman & MacLean, the Court stated
that congressional reenactment of a statutory scheme, in the face of numerous judicial
precedents, could be seen as a ratification of "well established judicial interpretation." Id.
at 385-86. See Mengler, supra note 9, at 260-67, for an exploration and rejection of this
adoption or ratification theory.
67. 894 F.2d 299 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 (1990).
68. Id. at 301-03.
69. 891 F.2d 548 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3272 (1990).
70. Id. at 550-52.
71. Teledyne, Inc. v. Kone Corp., 892 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir. 1989). The new statute,
63.
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the courts simply disagreed on the point whether a particular statute
authorized supplemental jurisdiction. Interpreting the same statutory
language in the same context, federal courts came to different conclusions on the scope of such jurisdiction. 72 The most favorable reading
of these cases was that the courts will address the question of supplemental jurisdiction on a statute-by-statute basis, a time-consuming and
expensive process with uneven results.
The one point upon which courts and commentators agreed, however, was that the decision in Finley was a genuine and substantial
threat to the doctrine of supplemental jurisdiction. For example, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that after Finley "the continued viability of the doctrine of pendent party jurisdiction in any context is seriously in question."73 A district court in Louisiana noted
that the impact of Finley "on supplemental jurisdiction in general is
potentially far-reaching."74 Legal scholars also expressed alarm at the
thrust of the Finley decision. President Lee, a member of the Federal
Courts Study Committee, and Professor Wilkens wrote: "Similar reasoning, applied to other jurisdictional statutes, would have a devastating effect on the availability of supplemental jurisdiction. "75 In his
frank and perceptive assessment of the law after Finley, Professor
Mengler observed: "Supplemental jurisdiction, therefore, is arguably
dead and surely expiring. "76
To prevent further erosion of supplemental jurisdiction, congressional action was necessary. In light of the Supreme Court's recent
curtailing of such jurisdiction and the lower federal courts' confusion
about the reach of the Finley case, Congress sought to remove the
28 U.S.C. § 1367(b), may overrule this holding to the extent it is a suit involving a foreign
sovereign based solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1332. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991);
28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(4) (1988).
72. Compare Stallworth v. City of Cleveland, 893 F.2d 830 (6th Cir. 1990) (disallowing pendent party claim for loss of consortium under 42 U.S.C. § 1983) with Rodriguez v.
Comas, 888 F.2d 899 (1st Cir. 1989) (allowing pendent party claim for loss of consortium
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
.
73. Roco Carriers, Ltd. v. M/V Nurnberg Express, 899 F.2d 1292, 1295 (2d Cir.
1990).
74. Community Coffee Co. v. MIS Kriti Amethyst, 715 F. Supp. 772, 774 (E.D. La.
1989).
75. Rex E. Lee & Richard G. Wilkins, An Analysis of Supplemental Jurisdiction and
Abstention with Recommendations for Legislative Action, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 321, 330.
See generally Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act and Civil Justice Reform Act: Hearings on H.R. 5381 and H.R. 3898 Before.the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administr,ation of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, IOlst
Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Hearings].
76. Mengler, supra note 9, at 248. See generally WRIGHT, supra note 36, § 3567.2, at
27-28 (Supp. 1991).
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uncertainty by codifying the law as it existed before the recent curtailment. Indeed, Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Finley essentially invited congressional action. 77
Furthermore, supplemental jurisdiction is a by-product of an important goal of modern civil procedure to join in a single civil action as
many claims and parties as feasible in the interest of "judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants."78 Without congressional
action, the courts would have continued eviscerating supplemental jurisdiction and thus undermined this important goal. An emasculated
doctrine would have resulted in duplicative or overlapping litigation in
state and federal courts. If parties cannot litigate all of their claims in
the federal forum, they will confront the hard choice of whether to
split their claims between state and federal courts, or take the entire
dispute to a state court. If federal jurisdiction on the federal claim is
exclusive, then splitting the claims will be the only avenue for relief as
in the Finley case. In addition, the Finley case had resulted, and
would have continued to result, in extended litigation over the question whether particular statutes do or do not authorize supplemental
jurisdiction. At a time of docket congestion in all courts, litigants
could not afford these additional expenditures of time, money, and
other resources.
II.

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

To appreciate the evolution of the proposal to codify supplemental jurisdiction as it moved through Congress, two broad inquiries
need to be made. First, Section II of this Article will examine the
history of section 120 of House Bill 538l,19 the bill that eventually
became the "Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of
1990. "80 Second, this Section will explore three areas of the legislative
development where the proposed provision for supplemental jurisdiction in House Bill 5381 differed significantly from the final product
embodied in section 1367 as enacted. The first area to be discussed is
the section 1367 provision defining the general scope of supplemental
77. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989).
78. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966). In C¥negie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988), the Court added "comity" to "judicial economy,
convenience, and fairness" as values that inform the scope and exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction, although the Gibbs decision did make reference to the impact of the doctrine
on federalism. Id. at 350.
79. H.R. REP. No. 734, IOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6860 and in. Hearings, supra note 75, at 315.
80. Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104
Stat. 5089, 5104 (1990) (to be codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
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jurisdiction. The next area to be discussed is the assignment of discretion to the judges in determining the scope and exercise of the authority conferred by section 1367. Finally, Section II will examine the
broad exception for diversity cases.
A.

History of Section 120 of House Bill 5381

The impetus for section 1367, the supplemental jurisdiction provision, came from recent Supreme Court decisions restricting supplemental jurisdiction8 } and from the Report of the Federal Courts Study
Committee. 82 The Report recommended "that Congress expressly authorize federal courts to hear any claim arising out of the same 'transaction or occurrence' as a claim within federal jurisdiction, including
claims, within federal question jurisdiction, that require the joinder of
additional parties, namely, defendants against whom that plaintiff has
a closely related state claim. "83 In their letter to Representative Kastenmeier, the authors of the original proposal stated: "Recent decisions of the Supreme Court, eroding the doctrine of supplemental
jurisdiction, have generated strong support for codification. . .. If we
are to arrest that [erosion] and breathe new life into the doctrine, urgent action by Congress is needed. "84
Section 1367 progressed through four stages of development
before enactment: first, the original proposal submitted to Representative Kastenmeier on June 8, 1990;85 second, the text of the proposed
section 1367 contained in section 120 of House Bill 5381,86 the bill
Representative Kastenmeier introduced on July 26, 1990; third, the
amendments to the bill recommended by the witnesses at the congressional hearing on September 6, 1990,87 and by Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler on September 11, 1990 (hereinafter Rowe81. Hearings, supra note 75, at 686-91 (Wolf-Egnal proposal). See generally STUDY
COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. III, vol. II, Working Papers and Subcommittee
Repons 546-68 (1990) (section on pendent and ancillary jurisdiction in the Report of the
Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts and their Relation to the States, for which
Professor Larry Kramer served as the reporter).
82. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 47-48.
83. Id. at 47.
84. Hearings, supra note 75, at 686 (letter of June 8, 1990, to Representative Kastenmeier from Professor Wolf).
85. Id. See Appendix B for text of the Wolf-Egnal proposal.
86. Hearings, supra note 75, at 2, 28-33. See Appendix C for text of H.R. 5381,
section 120.
87. Hearings, supra note 75, at 98, 155-56, 224-26, 735. See Appendix D for text of
the Weis proposal.
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Burbank-Mengler proposal);88 and fourth, the final version of section
1367 that became public law. The principal comparison should be
made between House Bill 5381 as introduced in Congress and as it
emerged from the subcommittee on September 13th, which became
section 1367 as enacted.
After the release on April 2, 1990, of the Report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee, the four members of Congress89 who had
served on the Federal Courts Study Committee directed their staffs to
prepare a bill that would include the "noncontroversial"90 recommendations of the Study Committee. 91 They defined "noncontroversial"
to include those Study Committee recommendations to which none of
them had objected, and which they anticipated would not draw significant opposition. 92 Simultaneously with the work of the subcommittee
staff, Professors Wolf and Egnal93 prepared a draft supplemental jurisdiction statute based on the prior case law and the Report of the Study
Committee. By letter dated June 8, 1990,94 they sent their proposal to
Representative Kastenmeier,95 a member of the Study Committee and
chair of the House JUdiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual
Property, and the Administration of Justice. 96 Three members97 of
88. Hearings, supra note 75, at 722. See Appendix E for text of the Rowe-BurbankMengler proposal.
89. The four members were Representatives Robert W. Kastenmeier and Carlos J.
Moorhead, and Senators Charles E. Grassley and Howell Heflin.
90. Hearings, supra note 75, at 103.
91. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. Mr. Geyh served as counsel to the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice during this period and was assigned to this bill. Mr. Geyh is currently a Professor of
Law at Widener University, Harrisburg, Pa.
92. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. For example, based on this definition, the
recommendation to repeal the general diversity jurisdictional statute did not qualify as
"noncontroversial" because Senator Grassley disagreed with that proposal, and because it
had generated significant opposition in the past. STUDY COMMfITEE REPORT, supra note
3, pt. II, at 42. Furthermore, Senator Grassley described the contents of the bill in a different way, including "only those consensus items that enjoyed unanimous support among
study committee members." 136 CoNG. REc. S17578 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
93. Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law.
94. Hearings, supra note 75, at 686.
95. For many years, Representative Kastenmeier served as the chair of the House
Judiciary Subcommittee for Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice. His interest in and devotion to matters affecting the federal courts are well known and
greatly admired by aficionados of the federal judicial system. See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe,
Jr., Jurisdictional and Transfer Proposals for Complex Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 325
(1991); Charles G. Geyh, Complex Litigation Reform and the Legislative Process, 10 REV.
LITIG. 401 (1991). In November, 1990, Representative Kastenmeier suffered an unexpected defeat in the congressional elections of that year. Representative William J. Hughes
now serves as chair of that subcommittee.
96. Professors Wolf and Egnal also sent the proposal to Senator Joseph Biden, chair
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the Study Committee opposed the recommendation to codify supplemental jurisdiction to the extent it embraced "pendent party jurisdiction,"98 which furnished cause for concern that the proposal might
attract opposition. 99 However, the Wolf-Egnalletter prompted Representative Kastenmeier to revisit the issue and to include the WolfEgnal proposal, as modified, in the draft bill, House Bill 5381.100 On
July 26, 1990, Representative Kastenmeier and Representative Moorhead, the other member of the House who served on the Federal
Courts Study Committee, introduced House Bill 5381, which contained the supplemental jurisdiction proposal in section 120 of the bill.
On September 6, 1990, the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice held a
one day hearing on House Bill 5381 and related bills. Some of the
witnesses addressed the supplemental jurisdiction provision. Assistant
Attorney General Stuart Gerson, representing the United States Department of Justice, opposed the entire section of House Bill 5381 that
would codify supplemental jurisdiction. 101 Judge Deanell Tachs, chair
of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Judicial Branch, testified
in favor of the supplemental jurisdiction provision recommending
"three minor changes."I02 Judge Joseph Weis, Jr., testified as the former chair of the Federal Courts Study Committee.103 He too supported the supplemental jurisdiction provision, but recommended the
adoption of the three changes offered by the Judicial Conference and
amendments relating to diversity cases. 104 Alan Morrison, representing Public Citizen Litigation Group (the Ralph Nader litigators),
"strongly support[ed] the supplemental jurisdictional provisions"lOs of
House Bill 5381 ,with some suggestions for amendment. 106
After the hearing on September 6, 1990, the subcommittee preof the Senate Judiciary Committee, and Senator Howell Heflin, chair of the relevant Senate
Judiciary Subcommittee.
97. Judge Levin H. Campbell, Morris Harrell, Esq., and Diana Gribbon Motz, Esq.
98. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 48.
99. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh.

100. Id.
101. Hearings, supra note 7S, at 201.
102. Hearings, supra note 7S, at ISS. The three changes were to delete the requirements in the bill that would: (1) impose a ninety-day limit on deciding whether the supplemental claims should remain in the case; (2) require the district judge to give the reasons
for dismissing any supplemental claim; and (3) direct the judges to certify state law questions to state courts in certain circumstances. Id. at ISS-S6, 73S.
103. Hearings, supra note 7S, at 86.
104. Id. at 9S, 96, 98.
lOS. Id. at 224.
106. Id. at 216-17, 22S-28.
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pared a substitute for section 120 of House Bill 5381 based on the
hearings I;lnd subsequent discussions with its consultants, primarily
Professors Rowe, Burbank, Mengler, and Kramer. 107 On September
13th, the subcommittee met and favorably reported House Bill 5381
with an amendment in the nature of a substitute. 108 The substitute
tracked largely the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler proposal of September
11th. On September 18, 1990, the Judiciary Committee by voice vote
reported House Bill 5381 favorably with an amendment in the nature
of a substitute. 109 On the same day, Representative Jack Brooks, chair
of the House Judiciary Committee, filed the Committee Report. llo
House Bill 5381 passed the House on September 27, 1990.
The Senate did not take up the matter until October 27, 1990.
While considering Senate Bill 2648 (the "Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990"), Senator Biden, the chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee,
and Senator Thurmond, the ranking minority member, offered an
amendment in the nature of a substitute that converted Senate Bill
2648 from a two title bill to an eight title bill. III The text of House
Bill 5381 became Title III of the omnibus bill, the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990. 112 Title III of the Biden-Thurmond substitute retained the short title in the House bill, "Federal Courts Study
Committee Implementation Act of 1990." 1\3 Before the Senate voted
on Senate Bill 2648, Senator Biden offered its text as a substitute for
the text of House Bill 5316, the House bill creating additional judgeships that became the vehicle for the omnibus bill. 114 The Senate
passed House Bill 5316 on October 27, 1990, and the House passed it
107. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. See H.R. REp. No. 734, supra note 79, at
27 n.13, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6873.
108. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6861. The legislative history in the Senate of the supplemental jurisdiction proposal is
limited to Senator Grassley's statement on the floor of the Senate, which essentially tracks
parts of the House Report. Ij~ CONGo REc. SI7577-17583 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
109. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 15-16, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
6860-61.
110. The date of "September 10, 1990," which is on the official print of the House
Report, supra note 79, is a typographical error. It should read "September 18, 1990."
Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler acted as the principal consultants in the drafting
of the House Report. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. See also H.R. REp. No. 734,
supra note 79, at 27 n.13, reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6873.
111. 136 CONGo REc. S17570, S17574 (daily ed. Oct. 27,1990). For the text of the
Biden-Thunnond amendment, No. 3204, see 136 CONGo REc. S17904-18 (daily ed. Oct. 27,
1990).
112. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990).
113. 136 CONGo REc. S17908 (daily ed. Oct. 27,1990).
114. Id. at SI7583-84.
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later the same day.1l5 The President approved the bill on December 1,
1990. 116
Section 120 of House Bill 5381 had several goals. These goals
were: to define supplemental jurisdiction as precisely as possible; to
authorize such jurisdiction broadly, but stop short of the full reach of
Article III judicial power; to permit the invocation of supplemental
jurisdiction uniformly by all persons and parties to federal lawsuits,
with one narrow exception in diversity cases; to circumscribe the discretion of federal judges to entertain or dismiss supplemental claims;
and to reassert the power of Congress as the principal actor in defining
the nature and scope of federal court jurisdiction, including supplemental jurisdiction. As enacted, the supplemental jurisdiction provision of section 1367 altered these goals (and House Bill 5381) in three
significant ways. First, it broadened the scope of supplemental jurisdiction generally. Second, it maximized judicial discretion in exercising supplemental jurisdiction and minimized statutory safeguards.
Third, it severely limited the use of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases. The following materials trace the proposal through the legislative process, focusing on these three areas.
B.

General Scope of Supplemental Jurisdiction

As introduced by Representative Kastenmeier, House Bill 5381
defined the general scope of supplemental jurisdiction by requiring the
person or party asserting the supplemental claim to meet a twopronged test. In determining whether the district court has the power
to entertain the supplemental claim, the plaintiff must meet two criteria: that the jurisdiction-conferring claim not be insubstantial and that
the jurisdiction-conferring and supplemental claims arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence. Both prongs derive from the Gibbs
case. Some commentators believe Gibbs established a three prong test:
the two noted above plus a showing that the jurisdiction-conferring
and supplemental claims would ordinarily be tried in one lawsuit. 117
Under House Bill 5381, as introduced, this third prong would not
have been a factor in determining initially whether the district court
had the power to entertain the supplemental claim. Rather, this third
prong would provide a basis for the district judge, in the exercise of
discretion, to dismiss the supplemental claim after the court deter115. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(104 Stat.) 5089, 5137.
116. Id.
117. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text.
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mined that it "should be tried separately."1l8
With regard to the first prong, the jurisdiction-conferring claim
(the "federal" or "anchor" claim, as it is sometimes called) must not
be "insubstantial."1l9 The second prong required that the "federal"120
and "non-federal"121 claims "arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences."122 In adopting the
phrases "federal" and "non-federal" claims, House Bill 5381 utilized
the terminology the Supreme Court employed in the Kroger case. 123
The "common transaction" formulation of House Bill 5381 differed
from Gibbs which used the phrase "common nucleus of operative
fact" to describe the relationship between the federal and non-federal
claims. 124 The "same transaction or occurrence" language came from
the recommendation of the Federal Courts Study Committee 125 and
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 126 It was not intended to "reach
118. Subsection (c)(3) of § 1367 contained in § 120 of H.R. 5381 as introduced on
July 26, 1990. Hearings, supra note 75, at 30.
119. Subsection (a)(I)(A) of § 1367 in § 120 of H.R. 5381. Hearings, supra note 75,
at 29. In the Gibbs case, the Court simply required that the "federal claim have substance
sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court." United Mine Workers v.
Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). It did not define the concept of "substantiality" any
further. Eight years later, the Court held that the jurisdiction-conferring ("federal") claim
need only be a claim that is not "obviously frivolous," "absolutely devoid of merit," or
"wholly insubstantial." Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37 (1974) (citations omitted).
See also Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666-67 (1974). The low
quantum of "federalness" the Court allowed to confer jurisdiction led Justice Rehnquist in
dissent to observe that, under this standard, the plaintiff need only "plead his claim with a
straight face." Hagans, 415 U.S. at 564 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
120. Subsection (g)(I) of § 1367 in § 120 of H.R. 5381 defined "Federal claim" as
"any claim that has an independent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in the district
courts." Hearings, supra note 75, at 31. This section was later omitted after the September
6, 1990, hearing.
121. Subsection (g)(2) of § 1367 in § 120 of H.R. 5381 defined "non-Federal" as
"any claim that does not have an independent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in
the district courts." Hearings, supra note 75, at 31. This subsection was omitted after the
September 6, 1990, hearing.
122. Subsection (a)(I)(B) of § 1367 in § 120 of H.R. 5381. Hearings, supra note 75,
at 29.
123. Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 372 n.ll (1978).
124. Whatever differences there may be in the meaning of these two phrases, the
"common transaction" language has a more ancient and familiar pedigree than "common
nucleus." See Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 609-10 (1926); RULES OF
PRAcrICE FOR THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF THE UNITED STATES, Rule 30,226 U.S. 627,
657 (1912).
125. In proposing that Congress expressly authorize supplemental jurisdiction, the
Federal Courts Study Committee recommended the use of the phrase "same transaction or
occurrence." STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 47. See generally Hearings, supra note 75, at 692.
126. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure employ that expression in Rules 10 (b),
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as far as Article III allows."127
At the hearing on September 6, no witness objected to the general
definition of supplemental jurisdiction contained in subsection (a)(I)
that set forth the two-pronged test. Although Judge Weis offered an
amendment in the nature of a substitute for the supplemental jurisdiction provision in House Bill 5381, his substitute for the general
("power") provision tracked closely the language of House Bill 5381.
His proposal authorized supplemental jurisdiction "over all other
claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences."128
In a proposal submitted to the subcommittee on September II,
1990, Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler l29 suggested that the
provision be broadened to permit supplemental jurisdiction to the full
reach of Article III of the United States Constitution. Their proposal
extended the jurisdiction to "all other claims that are so related to
claims within original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution."130
Interestingly, in the original proposal to Representative Kastenmeier
on June 8, 1990, Professors Wolf and Egnal recommended, in the alternative, that the supplemental jurisdiction provision in House Bill
5381 be as broad as the Constitution allows. t31 House Bill 5381, as
introduced, included the narrower provision (the "same transaction or
occurrence" formulation), which mirrored the recommendation of the
Federal Courts Study Committee. 132
At its September 13, 1990, markup, the subcommittee opted for
the broader provision contained in the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler proposal of September II, 1990. At this point, the supplemental jurisdiction
l3(a), 13(b), l3(g), l4(a), 14(c), IS(c), IS(d), and 20(a). See generally Hearings, supra note
7S, at 692.
127. Hearings, supra note 7S, at 692.
128. Id. at 98.
129. Professor Rowe had served as a reporter to the Federal Courts Study Committee. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, at Preface. Judge Weis also consulted
with Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler, together with Professor Larry Kramer (who
had also served as a reporter to the Study Committee), as he prepared his testimony for the
September 6, 1990, hearing. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. See also Hearings, supra
note 7S, at 9S.
130. Hearings, supra note 75, at 722.
131. Id. at 687, 692. Both the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler and the Wolf-Egnal proposals trace their ancestry to the Gibbs decision, which required, as the basis generally for
exercising supplemental jurisdiction, that "the relationship between [the federal] claim and
the [non-federal] claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional 'case.''' United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 71S, 725
(1966).
132. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 47.
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provision took final shape. The Committee Report states that the general provision "codifies the scope of supplemental jurisdiction first articulated by the Supreme Court"l33 in the Gibbs case. Together with
the language of the statute, this reference presumably states congressional intent to authorize the courts to exercise supplemental jurisdiction as far as Article III allows. Thus, the statute eliminates any gap
that may exist between "the same transaction or occurrence" formulation and the constitutional limits of Article III. Neither the final version of subsection (a) of section 1367 (the "power" section) nor its
legislative history addresses the point of whether the courts are to apply a two-pronged or a three-pronged test in determining the power
question. House Bill 5381, as introduced, sought to clarify that point
by expressly codifying a two-pronged test, while the final version of
section 1367 obscured it.
C.

Judicial Discretion

In addition to expanding the reach of supplemental jurisdiction,
section 1367, as enacted, also gave judges considerably more discretion
than under House Bill 5381, as introduced. The original version of
House Bill 5381 had several provisions that sought to circumscribe the
discretion of the courts in entertaining supplemental claims. Four areas merit attention: the "power" provision authorizing supplemental
jurisdiction; discretionary authority to dismiss supplemental claims;
certification of state law questions to state courts; and supersession of
federal "common law" development of jurisdiction.
1.

Power Provision

Subsection (a) of section 1367 delegates to the judiciary the authority to define the scope of supplemental jurisdiction. As noted
above, House Bill 5381 would have restricted supplemental jurisdiction to the "same transaction" formula, with all its attendant history
and precedents from the decisions under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and ancillary jurisdiction. If Congress had enacted section
1367 as contained in section 120 of House Bill 5381, as introduced, the
discretion left to the judiciary would have been considerably less than
under the Act as passed. Under the new section 1367, the courts will
define the scope of supplemental jurisdiction in each case. Since the
test of the reach of subsection (a) will be the scope of Article III, the
judges will need to address the constitutional question in each in133.
at 6875.

H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 29 n.15, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.

24

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 14:1

stance. Historically, Congress has defined the scope of federal court
jurisdiction. 134 However, this provision would reverse that role by
delegating to the courts the power to determine their jurisdiction in
cases involving supplemental claims. Congress should be loathe to assign such broad law-creating or interpretative authority to judges. 135
2.

Discretionary Dismissal

In the Gibbs decision, the Supreme Court, after defining the scope
of pendent jurisdiction under Article III of the Constitution, held that
the "power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to
exist."136 In short, the Court stated that district courts have discretion
to dismiss supplemental claims even though they have the power to
entertain them. House Bill 5381, as introduced, sought to control the
exercise of such discretion by defining clearly the criteria for discretionary dismissals, by requiring the district judge to provide written
reasons for such dismissals, and by imposing a limit on the time period
for exercising that discretion.

a.

Criteria for Dismissal

In Gibbs, the Court identified three instances when the district
court should exercise its discretionary power to dismiss the
supplemental claim: (1) if the federal claim (the jurisdiction-conferring claim) is "dismissed before trial"; 137 (2) if the non-federal questions (usually, but not, always, state law issues) "substantially
predominate"; 138 and (3) if circumstances exist that would "justify
separating state and federal claims for trial"139 under Rule 42(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Subsection (c) of the proposed section 1367 in section 120 of House Bill 5381, as introduced, codified
these three exceptions to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction,
seeking to confine the power of discretionary dismissal, identified in
Gibbs, to these three instances.
The substitute offered by Judge Weis at the September 6, 1990,
134. See supra notes 52-54.
135. In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), the Supreme
Court interpreted § 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.
§ 185(a) (1988), as authorizing the federal courts to create a federal common law of contracts in the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements in industries affecting commerce. Id. at 449-50. See generally Martha A. Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal
Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986).
136. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
137. [d.
138. Id.
139. [d. at 727.

1992]

CODIFICATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

25

hearing contained four grounds for discretionary dismissal: when the
supplemental claim "raises a novel or complex issue of State law";I40
when the non-feder~l claim "predominates" over the federal claim; 141
when the judge has dismissed the federal claim; 142 and when "there
are other appropriate reasons, such as judicial economy, convenience,
and fairness to the litigants, for declining jurisdiction,"143 a catch-all
basis for dismissal. The Rowe-Burbank-Mengler proposal of September 11 th also contained these four bases for dismissal. 144 Although the
hearings do not reflect it, other consultants to the subcommittee criticized the Weis substitute after the hearing on September 6th. 145 They
thought the discretion given to judges under the substitute to dismiss
the non-federal claims was too broad. Consequently, the subcommittee made two changes. They reinserted "substantially" back
into the phrase "substantially predominates,"I46 and narrowed considerably the catch-all exception by restricting it to "exceptional circumstances [when] there are other compelling reasons for declining
jurisdiction." 147
But these two changes did not address the more fundamental
question of whether the district judge should dismiss a supplemental
claim simply because it "raises a novel or complex issue of State
140. Hearings, supra note 75, at 98. In his testimony, Judge Weis did not explain the
basis for this ground of dismissal. It apparently came from a position paper prepared for
the Federal Courts Study Committee. STUDY CoMMfITEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. III,
vol. II, at 561-63,568. As introduced, subsection (f) of the proposed § 1367 in H.R. 5381
addressed this issue by requiring the district court to certify such questions to the state
courts, retaining jurisdiction of the entire case. Hearings, supra note 75, at 31, 696. See
also Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 363 U.S. 207
(1960); Railroad Comm'n. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Most states with certification procedures will accept certified questions from federal district courts. HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 40, at 1381. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 12.2.
141. Hearings, supra note 75, at 98. The Weis proposal deviated from the Gibbs
formulation in permitting a dismissal of the non-federal claim if it merely "predominated"
over the federal claim; Gibbs required that it "substantially" predominate. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
at 726.
142. Hearings, supra note 75, at 98.
143. Id. at 98. Judge Weis did not identify the source of this basis, but it appears to
be a memorandum prepared for the Federal Courts Study Committee. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. III, vol. I, at 561-63, 568. The memo in turn relies upon
that part of the Gibbs opinion where Justice Brennan sought to support the discretionary
power to dismiss non·federal claims: "Its justification lies in considerations of judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants." Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
144. Hearings, supra note 75, at 722.
145. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh.
146. H.R. REp. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11. Thus, the subcommittee restored to
the bill the formulation in § 120 of H.R. 5381, as introduced. See Hearings, supra note 75,
at 30.
147. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11.
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law."148 To be sure, some courts I49 have authorized such dismissals in
the wake of the Gibbs decision. ISO These dismissals, however, may be
inconsistent with some of the Supreme Court's decisions on abstention. For example, the Court has required the federal courts to abstain
from deciding "a novel or complex" state law issue when conjoined
with a federal constitutional claim. In Railroad Commission v. Pullman CO.,ISI where the state law question was novel or unclear, the
Court ordered a postponement of jurisdiction until the parties could
obtain a ruling from the state court on the state law questions. IS2 After securing a ruling from the state court, the parties could return to
the federal court to litigate the case to completion. Is3 In contrast,
where the state law question was "complex" and integral to a state
regulatory scheme, as in Burford v. Sun Oil CO.,IS4 the Court ordered
an outright dismissal of the action; requiring the plaintiff to litigate its
state and federal claims in the state court.
The legislative history of subsection (c)( 1) of section 1367 is silent
on the impact of that subsection on Pullman and Burford abstention.
By permitting the district court to dismiss outright supplemental
claims raising "a novel or complex issue of State law," the subsection
appears to overrule Pullman and its progeny, and codify a very expansive view of Burford. The overruling of Pullman and the codification
of Burford will come as an unpleasant surprise to federal court litigators, especially of section 1983 claims, ISS who frequently include
novel or complex state-law based claims in their federal complaints,
and expect to litigate them in one federal proceeding.
148.

28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c)(I) (West Supp. 1991).

149.

E.g., Pride v. Community School Bd., 482 F.2d 257, 272 (2d Cir. 1973).

150. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
151. 312 U.S. 496 (1941). The Pullman Company sued the Texas Railroad Commission to enjoin an order imposing racial segregation in passenger cars. The company based
its claims on state law and the Federal Constitution. Id. at 498.
152. See discussion infra Section II.C.3. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15,
§ 12.3.
153. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 12.3.
154. 319 U.S. 315 (1943). Sun Oil sued to enjoin an order of the Texas Railroad
Commission relating to oil leases that adversely affected the plaintiff's interests. Id. at 316.
Although the decision is not clear, it appears that Sun Oil asserted claims, as did the Pullman Company, based on both federal and state law. Id. at 317. Professor Chemerinsky
argues that Burford requires the state law issue to be unclear as well as complex before the
. court will abstain (dismiss), while Professor Field contends that complexity alone is
enough. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 12.2.3 n.77.
155. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). This statute is widely used to challenge the legality of
governmental 'action taken under color of state law.
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Reasons for Dismissal

To control further the exercise of judicial discretion, House Bill
5381, as introduced, contained another device. To ensure that the
judges cabined their discretionary dismissals to the grounds set out in
the draft section 1367, subsection (c) required the district judge to "file
with the order [of dismissal or remand] a written statement of the reasons for the dismissal or remand."lS6 The authors of the initial proposal stated: "The district court must not dismiss a non-federal claim for
any reason other than those identified in the statute."lS7
At the September 6 hearing, Judges Weis and Tacha objected to
subsection (c).158 Judge Weis did not offer any reason for his view, but
simply adopted by reference the Judicial Conference recommendation
to delete subsection (C)}S9 Judge Tacha, speaking for the Judicial
Conference, objected to Congress requiring district judges to file "a
separate written statement"l60 of their reasons for dismissing the supplemental claims. Judge Tacha did not object to compelling the district courts to state the grounds for dismissal, since "the circuit [court
of appeals] will require reasons anyway." 161 The basis for Judge
Tacha's objection to a "separate" written statement is not clear. Subsection (c) simply required the court to file a written statement in some
form to ensure that the reasons be included in a document. Further,
since Judge Tacha did not object conceptually to requiring the judges
to state the grounds for dismissal, he should have suggested that subsection (c) be amended to require merely that the district courts give
the reasons for dismissal in whatever form deemed appropriate. Striking the entire subsection seems a bit drastic._

c.

Time for Dismissal

In connection with the discretionary dismissal power, subsection
(c) also required the district courts to decide whether to retain jurisdiction over the supplemental claim within ninety days of its assertion}62 This provision was based on "the need for the court and the
parties to know early in the litigation whether the non-federal claim
156.
157.
judges to
158.
159.

Hearings, supra note 75, at 30, 694.
Id. at 695. Perez v. Ortiz, 849 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1988), seems to require district
state their reasons for dismissing supplemental claims. Id. at 798.
Hearings, supra note 75, at 96, 147, 155·56, 735.
Id. at 96.
160. Id. at 147, 735.
161. Id. at 147.
162. Id. at 30.
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will remain in the law suit."163 As with the written statement requirement of subsection (c), Judges Weis and Tacha objected to this provision, Judge Weis again incorporating by reference the Judicial
Conference position. l64 Judge Tacha objected because the provision
imposed "an unrealistic time frame"165 on the litigation process. The
Weis substitute thus omitted any reference to the ninety-day requirement. 166 The Rowe-Burbank-Mengler proposal tracked the Weis substitute in this regard. 167 The final committee version (which became
section 1367 as enacted) thus omitted any reference to a time period in
which to determine whether the supplemental claim(s) should remain
in the civil action. 168
The omission of the ninety-day provision from House Bill 5381,
as introduced, is very unfortunate. First, its deletion further expands
the discretion of the district court to dismiss supplemental claims by
removing any time limits for deciding whether such claims should be
dismissed. Under section 1367, as enacted, the federal judges may
now dismiss supplemental claims at any time during the litigation process, even after trial or on appeal. Under the original proposal, the
judges would have been restricted to the ninety-day period. Indeed in
Gibbs, the district court dismissed the last federal claim (jurisdictionconferring) after trial, but retained jurisdiction over and entered final
judgment upon the supplemental claims. 169 The Supreme Court
agreed that the district court's dismissal of the jurisdiction-conferring
claims did not deprive the court of jurisdiction over the supplemental
claims, and agreed that judgment could be entered upon those remaining claims.170 Under section 1367, the district courts or the appellate
courts could now dismiss the supplemental claims at any time.
Second, giving the district court greater discretion adds additional uncertainty to the litigation process in cases involving supplemental claims. If the district court is permitted to dismiss such claims
at any time in the process, including after trial, the parties to the civil
action cannot calculate accurately nor predict with any certainty the
time and cost of litigating in the federal court. The ultimate
nightmare, of course, is a case such as Mansfield, Coldwater & Lake
Id. at 695.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 147. See also id. at 735 (stating that the ninety-day provision is "an
requirement and burden on the court's control of its docket.").
Id. at 98.
Id. at 722.
H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11-12.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 720 (1966).
170. Id. at 728.

163.
164.
165.
unrealistic
166.
167.
168.
169.
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Michigan Railway v. Swan .171 There, after ten years of litigating, first
in the state courts and then on removal in the federal courts, the
Supreme Court decided that the federal trial court did not have jurisdiction. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff, the Court ordered
that the federal judge remand the case back to the state court where
the parties would begin the litigation process again.
Third, the settled rule is that jurisdiction depends "on the state of
things when the action is brought." 172 In Mosher v. City of Phoenix, 173
the Supreme Court held that "[j]urisdiction is thus determined by the
allegations of the [complaint] and not by the way the facts tum out or
by a decision of the merits."174 There is no reason to postpone the
decision to hear the supplemental claims, at least to determine if the
court has the power to do so, beyond the initial stages of the litigation
process. To permit discretionary dismissals at any time tends to undermine the fundamental point that jurisdiction should be determined
"when the action is brought," not "by the way the facts tum out,"
especially after the parties have expended time and money. Perhaps
the ninety-day period in House Bill 5381 was too short; perhaps it
should have been 180 days or some other period of time. If so, the
provision should have been amended, not omitted.
The important point is the scope of judicial discretion to dismiss
supplemental claims. Permitting that discretion to persist through the
entire litigation is counterproductive. If discovery is needed to determine whether the supplemental claims are within the scope of the statute, then the judge can order limited discovery for that purpose. In
addition, if the parties are mistaken as to the facts underlying the supplemental claims, Rule 12(h)(3) is available for a jurisdictional dismissal. 175 In the Kroger case, for example, the parties thought they were
of diverse citizenship only to find out later that they were citizens of
the same state. Since their initial view of diverseness proved incorrect,
the Court retained the power to dismiss the case when the true facts
became known.
The Supreme Court in the Gibbs case stated that the discretionary
authority to dismiss supplemental claims "remains open throughout
the litigation."176 But that statement was made twenty-six years ago
171.
172.
also supra
173.
174.
175.
176.

III U.S. 379 (1884).
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,824 (1824). See
note 40.
287 U.S. 29 (1932).
Id. at 30.
See generally FED. R. elV. P. 12(h)(3).
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966).
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when federal and state court dockets were not at the current levels. If
parties litigate a case vigorously through to the trial stage, the judge
should not retain the discretion to dismiss the supplemental claims,
absent discovery of facts to invoke Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. Unfortunately, under section 1367, the federal
judges may dismiss supplemental claims at any time, even after trial
and on appeal.
3.

Certification

Notions of federalism playa role in determining the scope and
exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. Since most supplemental claims
are rooted in state law,177 the federal courts are concerned that they
not make unnecessary rulings on state law questions. "Needless decisions of state law should be avoided both as a matter of comity and to
promote justice between the parties .... "178 By litigating supplemen. tal claims in state court, the parties will secure "a surer-footed reading
of applicable law."179 Subsection (f) of House Bill 5381 called upon
the district judges to certify certain questions of state law to the state
courts for resolution: "The district court, in determining the nature
and scope of any non-Federal claim based on State law, shall use any
certification procedures available for the determination of State
law."180 This provision was based on the Pullman abstention
doctrine. 181
177. Supplemental claims may also be rooted in the law of foreign states or arise out
of federal law, where Congress has excluded those claims from the federal courts. See. e.g.,
28 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1988) (claims under § 11707 of title 49 must exceed $10,000 to invoke
federal court jurisdiction); 15 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988) (damage claims under the Consumer
Product Safety Act must exceed $10,000 to invoke federal court jurisdiction). See also
Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528 (1974). Although these claims are arguably within the
reach of supplemental jurisdiction under § 1367, subsection (a) of § 1367 might exclude
them because of the qualifying language: "Except ... as expressly provided otherwise by
Federal statute .... " 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991).
178. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. See also Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343,
350 (1988).
179. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. Some commentators have suggested that state courts
may be the better forum for the entire litigation, including both federal and state claims.
See Steven H. Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural Review,
38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 381, 382 (1984) ("State courts have emerged in recent years as the
forum choice for an increasing number of plaintiffs suing state and local officials under 42
U.S.c. § 1983.") (footnotes omitted).
180. Hearings, supra note 75, at 31. Although subsection (I) employed the words
"shall use," the original Wolf-Egnal proposal employed the phrase "shall freely utilize" any
available certification procedures. Id. at 688. The idea was to require the judges to employ
certification where compelled by existing law, but to give them some discretion not to certify when the applicable precedents did not demand it. Id. at 696.
181. The doctrine is based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Railroad
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In Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,182 the plaintiff challenged a rule of the Texas Railroad Commission requiring racial segregation on trains. The plaintiff based its claims on state law and federal
constitutional law. The Supreme Court held that, if the state law
questions are unclear or uncertain, the federal court should abstain
from deciding them. The idea is to avoid unnecessary decisions on
federal constitutional issues if the case can be decided on state law
grounds. To respect the authority of the states, the Court ordered the
district court to send the parties to state court for a decision on the
state law questions, retaining jurisdiction over the case unless the parties, in repairing to the state courts, chose to litigate the dispute on the
merits, in whole or in part, in the state court. In the wake of the
Pullman decision, many states adopted certification procedures to facilitate the resolution of state law questions coming to them through
the abstention doctrine. 183
At the September 6, 1990, hearing, Judges Weis and Tacha objected to subsection (f). 184 Judge Weis did not offer any reason for his
view, but simply adopted by reference the Judicial Conference recommendation to delete that subsection. 18s Judge Tacha, speaking for the
Judicial Conference, objected to the certification procedure because it
would delay the processing of the case. 186 This objection to the certification procedure may be inconsistent with the provision in Judge
Weis' substitute (and the final version of the bill) authorizing discretionary dismissals when the supplemental claim "raises a novel or
complex issue of State law."187
The inconsistency is this: Judges Weis and Tacha testified in
favor of a provision authorizing dismissal at any time in the litigation
process of supplemental claims raising "novel or complex issues" so
that state courts could address them. In contrast, they opposed a certification procedure to accomplish the same goal without dismissal of
the supplemental claims. An outright dismissal of the supplemental
claims, especially after trial or on appeal, does not promote "the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity"188 any betComm'n
15, § 12.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note
312 U.S. 496 (1941).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 15, § 12.3.
Hearings, supra note 75, at 96, 147, 156, 735.
Id. at 96.
Id. at 147, 156, 735.
Id. at 98. See also H.R. REp. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11.
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988).
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ter than a certification procedure. Nonetheless the Subcommittee
deleted subsection (f) from the final version of the House Bill 5381.
4.

Supersession and Removal

House Bill 5381, as introduced, contained a provision that would
have prohibited the federal courts from developing "common law"
rules· of supplemental jurisdiction. 189 On several occasions, the
Supreme Court has acknowledged that the doctrines of pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction rest on judicial lawmaking. "[P]endent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency derived
from the general Article III language conferring power to hear all
'cases' arising under federal law or between diverse parties."I90 Similarly, the Court has noted: "In the courts of the United States this
ancillary jurisdiction may be exercised, though it is not authorized by
any statute."191 Commentators have noted the inconsistency between
this judicially-created law of supplemental jurisdiction and the traditional view that Congress authorizes and controls the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courtS. 192
Subsection (h) of the proposed section 1367 of House Bill 5381
sought to preclude the courts from exercising supplemental jurisdiction unless Congress expressly authorized it. 193 Subsection (h) read:
"[Section 1367] supersedes any other provision of law except to the
extent that a Federal statute expressly provides otherwise."194 When
coupled with the suggested repeal of sections 1338(b)19S and 1441(c)196
of title 28,197 the new section 1367 would have provided the exclusive
authority upon which to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Judge
Weis' substitute, offered to the subcommittee at the September 6 hear189. See generally Matasar & Bruch, supra note 42.
190. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 120 (1984). In
another part of the majority opinion, Justice Powell made the point that "pendent jurisdiction is a judge-made doctrine inferred from the general language of Article III." Id. at 117.
191. Murphy v. John Hofman Co., 211 U.S. 562, 569 (1909).
192. See supra note IS.
193. The definitions of "Federal claim" and "non-Federal claim" in subsection (g) of
the proposed section 1367 in H.R. 5381 reinforced the point that jurisdiction in the federal
courts must have a "statutory basis." Hearings, supra note 75, at 31.
194. Hearings, supra note 75, at 31.
195. See supra note 5 for text.
196. See supra note 6 for text.
197. The original Wolf-Egnal proposal recommended the repeal of these sections.
Hearings, supra note 75, at 700. The Federal Courts Study Committee recommended the
repeal of § 144I(c) if Congress retained the general diversity jurisdictional statute, but was
silent on the question of repealing § 1338(b). STUDY CoMMIlTEE REPORT, supra note 3,
pt. II, at 94-95.

1992]

CODIFICATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

33

ing, retained subsection (h) as subsection (f).198 Neither Judge Weis
nor Judge Tacha said anything about subsection (h) at the hearing.
However, the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler draft of September 11, 1990,
omitted subsection (h) of the original bill (subsection (f) of the Weis
substitute) for reasons that are not in the public record. 199 The final
subcommittee version similarly omitted subsection (h), making no
other reference to the concept of supersession. 2°O
Section 1367(a) begins with the words: "Except as provided in
subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal
statute . . . . "201 In correspondence between Professor Rowe and
Judge Weis,202 Professor Rowe suggested omitting subsection (h) and
replacing it with the qualifying language quoted in the previous sentence that now appears at the beginning of subsection (a). For supersession purposes, however, there is a significant difference between the
two formulations. Under subsection (h) in the proposed section 1367
contained in House Bill 5381, as introduced, the courts would be foreclosed from developing any common law rules of supplemental jurisdiction outside of section 1367.
In contrast, under subsection (a) of section 1367, as enacted, the
federal courts retain that common law authority. 203 The predicate
clause in subsection (a) simply recognizes the power of Congress expressly to limit the exercise by the courts of supplemental jurisdiction.
Although subsection (a) extends the reach of this jurisdiction to the
limits of Article III, the dependent clause that introduces the subsec198. Hearings, supra note 75, at 98.
199. Id at 722. See also Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme
Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDlCATURE 213 (1991).
200. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11-12. In amending the Rules Enabling
Act in 1988, Pub. L. 100-702, §§ 401(a), 407, 102 Stat. 4648, 4652 (1988), the House and
the Senate also confronted the issue of supersession in a related context: whether rules of
practice and procedure promulgated by the Supreme Court should supersede acts of Con·
gress. Although Representative Kastenmeier led the fight to remove the supersession
clause from existing law, see David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision, 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 2072 (West Supp. 1991), Congress retained the clause in the statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)
(1988), which reads in part: "All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect." Id. In contrast, § 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1789 had a contrary provision: "[T]he said courts of the United States shall have power
... to make and establish all necessary rules for the orderly conducting business in the said
courts, provided such rules are not repugnant to the laws of the United States." 1 Stat. 73,
83 (1789). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a) (1988). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The
Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015, 1035-39 (1982).
201. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991).
202. Letter from Thomas D. Rowe, Professor, Duke University School of Law, to
Judge Weis, Chairman, Federal Courts Study Committee, (Aug. 31, 1990) (on file with the
author).
203. See Appendix A for text of § 1367.
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tion refers to subsections (b) and (c) which are limitations on the general authority. This emphasizes the focus of the predicate clause as
the power of Congress to negate the exercise of supplemental jurisdic. tion. In sharp contrast, under subsection (h) of the original version of
House Bill 5381, the federal courts could not extend supplemental
jurisdiction beyond the statute without affirmative action by Congress.
The difference between the two approaches is critical. It goes to
the heart of competing jurisprudential theories of the relationship between Congress and the federal courts. It may be illustrated by reference to the case law 9£ supplemental jurisdiction that emerged in the
Aldinger-Kroger-Finley period. After Aldinger and Kroger, the courts
assumed they could exercise supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of
Article III, as Gibbs had held, unless a congressional statute negated
such exercise. That is, they could presume the existence of a 'broad
scope of supplemental jurisdiction unless Congress otherwise expressly
restricted it. After Finley, at least some courts took the opposite view:
a presumption against supplemental jurisdiction (at least in pendent
party cases) unless Congress expressly authorized it. Subsection (h)
would have adopted the Finley approach, building on the traditional
theory that Congress, not the judges, decides the scope of federal court
jurisdiction. In contrast, section 1367(a), as enacted, adopted the
Aldinger-Kroger approach: the courts may exercise supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of Article III except "as expressly provided
otherwise by Federal statute."204
In light of the deleted subsection (h), together with the deletion of
subsection (g),205 the federal courts may continue to develop a federal
common law of supplemental jurisdiction in areas where section 1367
is either silent or ambiguous. 206 For example, section 1367 does not
by its terms apply to cases removed from the state courts into the federal courts pursuant to Chapter 89 ofthe Judicial Code. 207 Many such
removal cases involve issues of supplemental jurisdiction because of
204. 28 V.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991). See generally Mouchawar, supra
note 35, at 1657-58.
205. Hearings, supra note 75, at 31 (text of subsections (h) and (g) in House Bill
5381); H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 11-12 (text of final version of the bill).
206. To the extent Congress has delegated authority to the federal courts under sub·
section (a) of § 1367 to determine the scope of an Article III "case," one might more
accurately refer to that development as "constitutional common law." See generally Henry
P. Monaghan, Foreward: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1975); but see
Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common Law, 91
HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978) (criticizing and critiquing Monaghan's approach). See generally Matasar & Bruch, supra note 42. Whatever label one attaches, the idea is that Congress retains the power to change judicially developed doctrine under § 1367(a).
207. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-1452 (1988).
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the multi-claim or multi-party (or both) nature of the original suit filed
in the state court. In some respects the issues are compounded because the plaintiff may have chosen the state court, recognizing the
subject-matter jurisdictional difficulties that arise in federal court. The
removal provisions, in giving the defendant the choice of forum, create
additional problems of supplemental jurisdiction.
The supplemental jurisdictional provisions in House Bill 5381, as
introduced, clearly applied to cases removed from the state courts to
the federal courts, as well as to actions commenced originally in the
district courtS.20S The Weis substitute and the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler proposal omitted all references to removal cases in their revisions
of the supplemental jurisdiction proposal. The public record does not
disclose the reasons for this omission. This gap is compounded by the
amendments to section 1441(c), which limit the reach of that subsection to civil actions arising under section 1331, the general federal
question jurisdictional statute. 209 A few years ago, the Supreme Court
applied Gibbs-type standards to supplemental claims in a case removed from state to federal court. 210 The legislative history of section
1367 is enigmatic as to the standards the courts should apply in removal cases. If the analysis above is correct, under the new section
1367, the federal courts retain a "common law" jurisdiction to fill
gaps. Presumably the courts will fill this particular lacuna by judicially-created common law of supplemental jurisdiction for removed
cases, analogizing to the principles and rules in section 1367.
The uncertainty surrounding the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in removal cases is compounded further because the Federal
Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of 1990 also amended
208. Hearings, supra note 75, at 28-32 (subsection (a)(I), the general provision, included "an action removed from a State court"; subsection (a)(2) restricted supplemental
jurisdiction in certain diversity cases "unless the action was removed from a State court";
and subsection (c) referred to "dismissal or remand").
209. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 5, 22-23. The host of uncertainties engendered by the failure to conform amended § 1441 to the new § 1367 includes the provision
authorizing remand only where "State law predominates." 28 U.S.c.A. § 1441(c) (West
Supp. 1991). In his letter to Judge Weis of August 21, 1990, Professor Kramer noted that
this limitation created an unexplained gap with the proposed § 1367(c), which identified
the grounds for discretionary dismissal of supplemental claims in civil actions filed originally in the district courts. Hearings, supra note 75, at 713. Judge Weis made no reference
to Professor Kramer's point in his testimony on September 6, 1990. Furthermore, both the
Wolf-Egnal proposal, Hearings, supra note 75, at 700, and the Federal Courts Study Committee, STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 94-95, recommended outright
repeal of § 1441(c). The Study Committee recommended repeal "only if Congress retains
the general diversity jurisdiction." Id. at 95. Congress did retain diversity jurisdiction,
although it imposed limitations regarding supplemental claims.
210. Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
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section 1441(c).211 Under former section 1441(c), the district court on
removal had jurisdiction over "the entire case,"212 including "separate
and independent ... otherwise non-removable claims."213 Under the
1990 amendments,214 removal of "separate and independent" claims
that would otherwise be "non-removable" is restricted to actions arising under section 1331 of title 28,215 the general federal question jurisdictional statute. Although the Federal Courts Study Committee
recommended that section 1441(c) be repealed outright,216 the 1990
Act simply restricted its applicability to actions arising under section
1331.
The legislative history is silent on the relationship between the
amended section 1441(c) (and removal in general) and section 1367.
The House Report, however, addresses the matter indirectly:
In many cases the federal and state claims will be related in such a
way as to establish pendant [sic] jurisdiction over the state claim.
Removal of such cases is possible under section 1441 (a). The
amended provision would establish a basis for removal that would
avoid the need to decide whether there is pendant [sic]
jurisdiction. 217
211. After the recent amendments, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) reads: "Whenever a separate
and independent claim or cause ofaction, [within the jurisdiction conferred by section 1331
of this title,] is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action,
the entire case may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or,
in its discretion, may remand all matters [in which state law predominates]." 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1441(c) (West Supp. 1991). Section 312 of the Federal Courts Study Implementation Act
of 1990 amended this section to limit its reach to cases within the jurisdiction of the general
federal jurisdictional statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331 (West Supp. 1991). See 104 Stat. 5089,
5114 (1990). Prior to the recent amendments, § 1441(c) read: "Whenever a separate and
independent claim or cause of action, [which would be removable if sued upon alone,] is
joined with one or more otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case
may be removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion,
may remand all matters [not otherwise within its original jurisdiction]." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1441(c) (1988). The 1990 statute added the bracketed material to the amended § 1441(c)
and omitted the bracketed materials from the former section. Prior to the recent amendments to § 144 1(c), the Supreme Court had interpreted that subsection not to apply to
supplemental claims in cases removed from state courts to federal courts. Carnegie-Mellon
Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
212. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1988).
213. Id.
214. Section 312 of the Federal Courts Study Committee Implementation Act of
1990, Title III of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat.
5089,5114 (1990).
215. Id.
216. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 94-95. The original WolfEgnal proposal to Representative Kastenmeier also recommended the repeal of § 1441(c)
as well as § 1338(b) of title 28. Hearings, supra note 75, at 700.
217. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 23. The use of the phrase "pendant [sic]
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This legislative history suggests that the old law of pendent jurisdiction (and inferentially the new law of supplemental jurisdiction) is
"possibly" incorporated into subsection (a) of section 1441 presumably by reason of prior case law. 218
But the legislative history also states that prior law is not needed
because the amended section 1441(c) will take care of all such questions. If pendent (and thus supplemental) claims are not "separate
and independent," however, as Cohil/ 219 held, then the amended section 1441(c) cannot be a substitute for supplemental jurisdiction unless
the courts, in light of this legislative history, reinterpret the phrase
"separate and independent" to include all supplemental claims. 220
The amended section 1441(c) also raises the question whether, in
light of prior interpretation of "separate and independent," it has any
utility regarding supplemental claims. At least one commentator has
declared the amended section effectively useless. 221 The argument is
that, since subsection (a) of section 1367 reaches to the limits of Article III, section 1441(c), ifit seeks to reach further, "would pose a constitutional issue."222 This may be true if one accepts the definition of
"one constitutional 'case' " as Gibbs defined it (whether one adopts a
two-pronged or three-pronged test). If, however, Congress has the
power to define "one constitutional 'case or controversy' " differently
(and more broadly) from Gibbs, then section 1441(c) might very well
be constitutional.
The argument is that a "case" or "controversy" could include, for
example, all claims a plaintiff has against a defendant even if they arise
jurisdiction" is odd since the same act establishes supplemental jurisdiction in new section
1367, and thus abolishes the older tenninology of "pendent" and "ancillary" jurisdiction.
218. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
219. Id.
220. Logically, this interpretation would be a very sensible one were it not for the
prior decisions of the Supreme Court. See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343
(1988); American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6 (1951). In these cases, the Court
held that, if the plaintiff's claims are a result of "a single wrong," they are not "separate
and independent" even if the claims are rooted separately in state and federal law. Cohill,
484 U.S. at 350-51; Finn, 341 U.S. at 14. The reader should contrast this interpretation
with the Court's very different approach in applying the "independent and adequate" state
grounds doctrine to preclude Supreme Court review of state court judgments. In such
instances, the Court essentially considers state and federal grounds for decision as "separate and independent" for purposes of precluding review, even though these grounds are
rooted in a single wrong. See generally CHEMER1NSKY, supra note IS, § lO.5. Perhaps
Congress has the power to force a judicial reinterpretation of statutory language even
though the same words remain in the statute.
221. David D. Siegel, Changes in Federal Jurisdiction and Practice Under the New
(Dec. 1. 1990) Judicial Improvements Act, 133 F.R.D. 61, 78-79 (1991) (section 1441(c)
"may have to grope for some gainful employment").
222. Id. at 79.
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out of totally separate transactions or occurrences, or do not have a
common nucleus of operative fact. The legislative history supports
this interpretation: "The joinder rules of many states permit a plaintiff
to join completely unrelated claims in a single action. The plaintiff
could easily bring a single action on a federal claim and a completely
unrelated state claim."223 In short, a Rule 18(a)-type joinder is constitutionally permissible if Congress authorizes it, even if each claim does
not have an independent basis of jurisdiction. One might ask why
Congress would have a broader rule of supplemental jurisdiction on
removal than in original actions filed in the district court. The answer
may be to prevent plaintiffs from adding unrelated, non-removable
claims to their state court suits to deprive the defendant of his or her
right to litigate the federal questions in a federal forum. 224
D.

Diversity Exception

Subsection (b) of section 1367 carves out an exception for certain
supplemental claims asserted in civil actions brought solely under section 1332 of title 28. The thrust of subsection (b) is to preclude voluntary or involuntary plaintiffs or persons see~ng to become plaintiffs
(for example, intervenors) from asserting any supplemental claim that
would be "inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section
1332."225 This potentially sweeping limitation to the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction has already generated controversy. Professor
Freer has written that the new statute "embodies a disquieting bias
against diversity of citizenship jurisdiction that maims packaging [of
jurisdiction-conferring and supplemental claims] in diversity cases."226
Section 1367(b), as enacted, differs significantly from the comparable provisions in House Bill 5381, as introduced. First, under the
223. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 23.
224. See supra note 220.
225. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991).
226. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity. supra note 9, at 446.
For a spirited defense of the statute, see Thomas D. Rowe et aI., Compounding or Creating
Confusion about Supplemental Jurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943
(1991). For an equally vigorous response to this response, see Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.I. 963 (1991) [hereinafter Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws].
Not to be outdone, Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler further rejoined in Thomas D.
Rowe et aI., A Coda on Supplemental Jurisdiction, 40 EMORY L.J. 993 (1991). Professors
Arthur and Freer offered the "final" non-final words in Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D.
Freer, Close Enough for Government Work: What Happens When Congress Doesn't Do Its
Job, 40 EMORY L.J. 1007 (1991). Although supportive of the new statute, one commentator argues that subsection (b) is susceptible of three distinct and varying interpretations.
Mouchawar, supra note 35, at 1659-62.
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earlier version of House Bill 5381, the restriction applied only to actions based "solely on diversity of citizenship under section 1332."221
According to the terms of section 1367(a), the restrictions on the assertion of supplemental claims apply to all actions "founded solely on
section 1332,"228 including alienage and foreign state as plaintiff cases.
Although the legislative history discloses an intent to limit the assertion of supplemental claims only in diversity cases,229 the subsection
applies, even if "through inadvertence, "230 to all actions brought pursuant to section 1332, not just diversity cases. 231
Second, the intent of the earlier provision was "to retain the essence of the complete diversity requirement that derives from Strawbridge v. Curtiss. "232 Thus, the earlier version would have prohibited
the original plaintiff or plaintiffs from joining non-diverse defendants
in the original action filed in the federal court. 233 However, if an original defendant impleaded a non-diverse defendant, then the original
plaintiff or plaintiffs could have asserted a supplemental claim against
the impleaded (non-diverse) defendant. This approach would also
have prevailed regarding other joined parties or intervenors. In short,
as introduced, the provision would have overruled the holding, but not
the result, in Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger. 234
Section 1367(b)implements the complete diversity requirement in
a much wider variety of circumstances than House Bill 5381, as introduced. Indeed, section 1367 imposes greater restrictions than are justified by "pre-Finley practice. "235 The legislative history refers to this
expansion as "one small change."236 It codifies the ruling in Kroger by
227. Hearings, supra note 75, at 29.
228. 28 U.S.C,A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991).
229. H.R. REp. No. 734, supra note 79, at 29.
230. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity, supra note 9, at 475.
231. See generally id. at 474-75.
232. Hearings, supra note 75, at 692.
233. The restrictions in draft § 1367(a)(2) contained in § 120 of H.R. 5381, as introduced, applied only to "the original plaintiff," a phrase which the Supreme Court later
employed to describe the limits of ancillary jurisdiction in a diversity action. FreeportMcMoRan, Inc. v. K N Energy, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 858, 860 (1991) (per curiam).
23:4. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). Under the proposed § 1367 in H.R. 5381, the district
court would have retained the discretionary power to dismiss the supplemental claim if it
"substantially predominates" over the jurisdiction-conferring claim. Hearings, supra note
75, at 30. In Kroger, the supplemental claim was the only claim remaining in the case after
the judge, at the outset of the litigation, dismissed the jurisdiction-conferring claim against
the original diverse defendant. Thus, under the proposed statute, the judge would have
dismissed the supplemental claim as well.
235. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 29. See generally Freer, Compounding
Confusion and Hampering Diversity, supra note 9; Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Burnt
Straws, supra note 226.
236. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 29. Professor Freer diSagrees as to the size
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prohibiting plaintiffs from asserting a supplemental claim against impleaded, non-diverse defendants. In addition, the original plaintiff or
person(s) later joined or joining as plaintiffs are forbidden to assert
supplemental claims (probably including counterclaims) against any
non-diverse party. But the complete diversity requirement is abandoned in other instances. For example, as under prior practice, the
restrictions in subsection (b) by their terms do not apply to supplemental claims asserted by defendants against non-diverse parties,
plaintiff or defendant. Thus, an impleaded third party defendant may
assert a supplemental claim against the plaintiff, but the plaintiff cannot assert a supplemental claim against that defendant. 237
Perhaps also "through inadvertence," section 1367(b), as enacted,
appears to permit two plaintiffs in a diversity action to sue a defendant
who is not diverse from one of the plaintiffs so long as the other plaintiff is diverse from the defendant. 238 In addition a non-diverse plaintiff
who is later joined may also assert such a claim. Three of the consultants to the House Subcommittee on the new statute agree that the
statute has these 100pholes. 239 The gaps exist because section 1367(b)
restricts the use of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases only
"over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14,
19,20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules,
or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24. "240 The restriction
does not on its face reach the plaintiff initially or later joined under
Rule 20(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Thus, the statute could be interpreted to overturn the complete
diversity rule of Strawbridge in the simplest of cases to which it has
always applied. Professors Rowe, Burbank, and Mengler offer an interpretation that would close this "potentially gaping hole in the complete diversity requirement-either by regarding it as an unacceptable
circumvention of original diversity jurisdiction requirements, or by
reference to the intent not to abandon the complete diversity rule that
is clearly expressed in the legislative history of section 1367."241 This
approach raises again the jurisprudential points noted earlier: whether
of the change effected by subsection (b). Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering
Diversity, supra note 9, at 475-86. See also Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws,
supra note 226.
237. See generally Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity, supra
note 9, at 478-82.
238. See generally Arthur & Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws, supra note 226.
239. Rowe et aI., supra note 226, at 961 n.91.
240. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
241. Rowe et aI., supra note 226, at 961 n.91.
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the courts may prefer the "spirit" of a statute over its express language, and whether the courts will continue to develop a common law
of supplemental jurisdiction. Jurisprudence aside, at least some judges
appear to have adopted the Rowe-Burbank-Mengler interpretive
approach. 242
Finally, since the new statute requires compliance with all of "the
jurisdictional requirements of section 1332,"243 the plaintiffs must also
satisfy the amount in controversy restriction in section 1332.244 This
limitation arguably overrules Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble,245
which required only the named plaintiffs in a class action suit to satisfy
the complete diversity requirement. The legislative history, however,
states: "The section is not intended to affect the jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions, as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley."246 This conflict between
the words of the statute and the legislative history raises the jurisprudential point as to which should prevail. On occasion, the Supreme
Court has given primacy to the purpose of a statute or the intention of
the legislature over its express language. In Church o/the Holy Trinity
v. United States,247 for example, the Court noted the "familiar rule,
that a thing may be within the letter of the statute and yet not within
the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intention of its
makers."248
Third, the original provision in House Bill 5381 would have applied the complete diversity restriction on supplemental claims in diversity cases only if the plaintiff originally filed the action in the
federal district court. If the defendant removed the case from the state
court, then the restriction would not apply and the normal rule of
supplemental jurisdiction, as set out in subsection (a), would apply.249
Neither the enacted section 1367 nor the legislative history makes ref242. See Fink v. Heath, No. 91-C2982, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9182 (N.D. Ill. July
2, 1991); c/. Cheramie v. Texaco, Inc., No. 91-3114, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15616 (E.D.
La. Oct. 30, 1991).
243. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(b) (West Supp. 1991).
244. This amount is now $50,000.
245. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
246. H.R. REP. No. 734, supra note 79, at 29 (footnote omitted). In the omitted
footnote, the Report expressly refers to the Cauble case as well as Zahn v. International
Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973), which required each member of the plaintiff class to satisfy
the amount in controversy requirement.
247. 143 U.S. 457 (1892).
248. Id. at 459. See also Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); United Steelworkers
of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-02 (1979).
249. See Appendix A for text of § 1367.
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erence to removed cases. As noted earlier,250 the amendments to section 1441(c) of title 28 are enigmatic at best on the question of the
relationship between the standards for the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction in removal cases and the standards in cases filed originally
in the district court to which section 1367 applies.
Fourth, in comparing House Bill 5381 as introduced and section
1367(b) as enacted, the question arises as to which, if either, more
faithfully adheres to the recommendations of the Federal Courts Study
Committee. The House Report refers to the Study Committee recommendation to codify supplemental jurisdiction. Apart from an ambiguous reference to "federal question jurisdiction,"25I the Study
Committee report is silent on the question whether diversity cases
should be treated differently from federal question cases. In his prepared congressional statement, Judge Weis, the chair of the Study
Committee stated: "I must confess that the Study Committee Report
on [supplemental] jurisdiction is not as precise as it might have been,
but I do recall discussion during one of our meetings that supplemental jurisdiction should be limited to federal question cases. "252
Similarly, the Report to the Federal Courts Study Committee of
the Subcommittee on the Role of the Federal Courts and their Relation
to the States also recommended that supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases be limited. 253 This report appears in Part III of the Study
Committee Report.254 The Study Committee made it clear, however,
that the materials in Part III of its report were not considered authoritative. The introduction to Part III states: "In no event should the
enclosed materials be construed as having been adopted by the Committee."25s In addition, the report of the subcommittee offers this disclaimer: "Not every member of the subcommittee has agreed to all of
the proposals or analysis contained in this Report, and the absence of
dissent should not be understood to signify approval."2S6 Furthermore, reliance on Judge Weis' recollection of subcommittee or committee discussions would also be inappropriate if they did not find
250. See supra notes 207-18 and accompanying text.
251. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 47. In Judge Weis' prepared statement to the subcommittee, he inexplicably omits the reference to "federal question jurisdiction" in quoting from the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee.
Hearings, supra note 75, at 92-93.
252. Hearings, supra note 75, at 93.
253. STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. III, vol. II, at 563-68.
254. Id.
255. Id. pi. III, vol. I, at first page (unnumbered).
256. Id. at first page (unnumbered) of subcommittee report.

1992]

CODIFICATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

43

expression in the text or recommendations of the Study Committee
Report.
Perhaps one could justify the limitations on supplemental jurisdiction in certain diversity cases by reference to prior case law257 or to
the recommendation of the Study Committee to abolish diversity jurisdiction generally with three limited exceptions. 258 These approaches
have several problems. First, the Study Committee recommendation
to Congress to authorize supplemental jurisdiction is at best ambiguous both regarding prior case law and the restrictions in diversity
cases.
Second, the Study Committee, as an alternative proposal, recommended restricting diversity jurisdiction if Congress opted not to abolish it altogether. This "backup proposal" contained four distinct
elements which collectively would have further restricted the exercise
of diversity jurisdiction without abolishing it.2 59 None of these elements included any reference to supplemental jurisdiction. If the
Study Committee intended to restrict the use of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases, one would have expected to find that recommendation either in this back-up proposal, or in the recommendation
on supplemental jurisdiction itself.
Third, reliance on the Study Committee recommendation to abolish diversity as the source for restricting the exercise of supplemental
jurisdiction in diversity cases confronts another difficulty. As noted
earlier,260 the four members of Congress26 \ who served on the Study
Committee directed their staffs, in the spring of 1990, to draft a bill
that included only the "noncontroversial"262 recommendations of the
Study Committee. They defined "noncontroversial" to include those
recommendations to which none of the four members of Congress had
objected and which would not generate significant opposition. 263
While these four members agreed with the recommendation to authorize supplemental jurisdiction expressly by statute,264 only three of
257. See, e.g., iii. at 563-67.
258. Id. pt. II, at 38- 43.
259. Id. pt. II, at 42.
260. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
261. The four members were Representatives Robert Kastenmeier and Carlos Moorhead, and Senators Howell Heflin and Charles Grassley.
262. Conversation with Charles G. G.eyh. See also Hearings.supra note 75, at 103.
263. Conversation with Charles G. Geyh. On the floor of the Senate, Senator
Grassley described his understanding of "noncontroversial" in a slightly different way. He
stated that the proposals in the pending legislation embodied "only those consensus items
that enjoyed unanimous support among study committee members." 136 CONGo REC.
S17578 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990) (emphasis added).
264. See STUDY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 47-48.
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them agreed to abolish diversity jurisdiction. 265 Senator Grassley opposed "the complete abolition of diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. "266
In addition, the House of Representatives had on recent occasions
sought to abolish diversity jurisdiction completely. In both instances,
the bill passed the House only to flounder in the Senate. Opposition
from the trial lawyers and other segments of the bar caused the defeat
of the bill. 267 Although the American Bar Association originally supported the move to abolish diversity, it later changed its mind under
pressure from the bar.268 A provision to restrict severely the utilization of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity actions would have
aroused opposition had the matter been widely known. On the other
hand, a bill that treated diversity and federal question actions equally
with regard to supplemental claims might have provoked vigorous opposition from the federal bench.
Of course, one could read the recommendations of the Study
Committee as favoring supplemental jurisdiction equally in federal
question and diversity cases. If so, then the original proposal in House
Bill 5381, which contained a modest restriction on supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases, would also be inconsistent with the Study
Committee Report. Thus, we may be left with an equally authoritative or nonauthoritative reading of the tea leaves left behind by the
Study Committee. In this context, then, Judge Weis' recollection of
discussions, even if they never found their way into the Study Committee Report, helps to clarify to some degree the intent of at least
some members of the Study Committee on the critical question of the
availability of supplemental jurisdiction in diversity cases.

III.

POST-STATUTE DECISIONAL LAW

Although section 1367 is barely one year old, it has provided the
basis for supplemental jurisdiction in numerous cases. Its regular use
demonstrates the need for the statute and the widespread invocation of
265. The three were Representatives Kastenmeier and Moorhead, and Senator
Heflin.
266. STUDY COMMITIEE REPORT, supra note 3, pt. II, at 42. When the bill containing § 1367 came to the floor of the Senate, Senator Grass1ey supported it and included in
the Congressional Record a section-by-section analysis of the supplemental jurisdiction
proposal, which tracked nearly verbatim the House Judiciary Committee Report. 136
CONGo REC. S17580-81 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
267. Letter from Arthur D. Wolf, Professor, Western New England College School
of Law, to Thomas M. Mengler, Professor, University of Illinois College of Law (Aug. 31,
1990). Hearings, supra note 75, at 719.
268. Id.
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supplemental jurisdiction in the federal courts. Most of the decisions
are still unreported, although they may be found in electronic
databases. Based on this limited sample, one can draw few conclusions about the success or failure of the statute to perform its stated
goals. However, a preliminary survey of the decided cases discloses
some predictable problems and results, and a few surprises.
First, although section 1367 became effective on December 1,
1990, courts have disagreed as to whether this section is relevant to
actions commenced prior to its effective date. 269 Section 310(c) of this
Act made section 1367 applicable only "to civil actions commenced on
or after the date of enactment of this Act."27o Consequently, a
number of cases have rejected the application of section 1367 because
the action was commenced before December 1, 1990. 271 However,
some of these courts have nonetheless utilized the statute to confirm
(and perhaps to influence) their reading of the law prior to the enactment of the statute. 272 For example, Judge Posner, a member of the
Federal Courts Study Committee, appeared to take this approach in a
recent court of appeals decision. 273 In addition, at least one court
seems to have utilized section 1367 to determine, rather than confirm,
the pre-statute practice or rule of supplemental jurisdiction. 274
Furthermore, other issues have arisen regarding the effective date
of the statute. At least one court has held that the relevant date is not
the commencement of the original action, but rather the date the party
asserting the supplemental claim filed the relevant pleading. 275 Similarly in removal cases, the relevant date appears to be the date of re269. President Bush approved the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 on December
I, 1990.
270. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 31O(c), 104 Stat.
5089, 5114 (1990).
271. E.g., Samaad v. City of Dallas, 940 F.2d 925 (5th Cir. 1991); Salazar v. City of
Chicago, 940 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1991); Scott v. Long Island Say. Bank, FSB, 937 F.2d 738
(2d Cir. 1991); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Continental Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357 (7th Cir. 1990).
272. E.g., Promisel v. First Am. Artificial Flowers, Inc., 943 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1991),
cert. denied, No. 91-864, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 539 (Jan. 21, 1992); Castellano v. Board of
Trustees, 937 F.2d 752 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 378 (1991); Scott v. Long Island
Say. Bank, FSB, 937 F.2d 738 (2d Cir. 1991); Chesley v. Union Carbide Corp., 927 F.2d 60
(2d Cir. 1991); Webb v. Just In Time, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 993 (E.D. Mich. 1991); Perkins v.
City of Philadelphia, 766 F. Supp. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Flores v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 776
F. Supp. 61 (D.P.R. 1991).
273. Winstead v. J.C. Penney Co., Inc., 933 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1991).
274. Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 1991).
275. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 769 F. Supp. 85 (E.D.N.Y. & S.D. N.Y.
1991). The plaintiffs commenced the original action before December I, 1990, while a
defendant filed the third party complaint that asserted the supplemental claim after that
date.
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moval rather than the date the case began in the state court.276
Second, the district judges have typically relied on section 1367,
with little or no analysis, to determine whether they have the power to
entertain the particular supplemental claims asserted in the action
before them. 277 In pre-statute days, the courts would apply the twoprong or three-prong test of Gibbs to make that determination. 278 The
post-statute decisions tend to refer simply to section 1367 without
more. Thus, the decisions do not seem to struggle at all with the question whether the claims "form part of the same case or controversy
under Article III of the United States Constitution."279
In contrast, some of the recent cases have discussed, however
briefly, the statutory prerequisites for exercising supplemental jurisdiction. The decisions vary as they did prior to the statute. Some courts
apply a three-factor Gibbs test ("substantiality," "common nucleus,"
and "expected to try") to determine whether they have the power
under section 1367(a) to entertain supplemental claims. 280 Other
judges apply a two-factor test ("common nucleus" and "expected to
try").281 In one case, the court referred to these two Gibbs factors in
interpreting section 1367, but applied only the common nucleus test to
determine whether supplemental jurisdiction in fact existed. 282 Finally, in another case, the court made reference only to the "common
nucleus" factor to determine whether it had the power to entertain the
supplemental claims. 283
276. Ryan v. Cosentino, 776 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. III. 1991); Cedillo v. Valcar Enter.
& Darling Del. Co., 773 F. Supp. 932 (N.D. Tex. 1991); cf. Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic
Corp., 763 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
277. E.g., SaIyard v. Trustees of Bryn Mawr College, No. 91·1812, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15900 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 1991); Marco v. Accent Publishing Co., Inc., No. 91-2057,
1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14718 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 1991); Richardson v. Kraft-Holleb Food
Serv., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 1108 (N.D. III. 1991); Merchant & Evans, Inc. v. Roosevelt Bldg.
Prods. Co., 774 F. Supp. 1467 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Travis v. Mattern, No. 90-7929, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11489 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 1991); American Millworks v. Mellon Bank Corp.,
No. 88-6153, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8393 (E.D. La. June 13, 1991); Martinez v. Shinn,
No. C89-813-JBH, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6985 (E.D. Wash. May 20, 1991).
278. See supra notes 25-51 and accompanying text.
279. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West Supp. 1991).
280. E.g., Arnold v. Kimberly Quality Care Nursing Serv., 762 F. Supp. 1182 (M.D.
Pa. 1991). See supra note 36.
281. Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., No. C91-1708 RFP (ENE), 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15887 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1991); Corporate Resources, Inc. v. Southeast Suburban
Ambulatory Surgical Ctc., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 503 (N.D. III. 1991); Cedillo v. Valcar Enter.
& Darling Del. Co., 773 F. Supp. '932 (N.D. Tex. 1991); Di Loreto v. Di Loreto, No. 908126, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10075 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1991).
282. See Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 603 (3d Cir. 1991).
283. Rosen v. Chang, 758 F. Supp. 799, 803 (D.R.I. 1991); accord Ryan v. Cosentino, 776 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. III. 1991).
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Third, some cases have found it unnecessary to invoke section
1367 because existing law already authorizes supplemental jurisdiction. In Friedman v. Stacey Data Processing Services, Inc.,284 for example, the complaint asserted a copyright claim together with a state
law claim of unfair competition. Relying on section 1338(b),28S one of
the few provisions in the United States Code that expressly authorized
supplemental jurisdiction prior to section 1367, the court held that it
did not have to analyze the new statute because the supplemental
claim fit within section 1338(b).286 Similarly, in a civil action based on
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,287 the court also found that
statute sufficiently broad to cover the supplemental claims, although it
also relied alternatively on section 1367. 288
Fourth, in the few removal cases that have raised supplemental
jurisdiction issues since the enaCtment of section 1367, the courts have
apparently followed the principles of section 1367,289 although the
statute and legislative history are unclear as to their applicability.290
In discussing the use of supplemental jurisdiction in removal cases,
this Article earlier noted difficulties with the new statute: the problematic reliance upon section 1441(c), as amended, as the source of
authority for supplemental jurisdiction; and the silence of the statute
and legislative history as to the standards to apply in removal cases.
Doe v. Alpha Therapeutic Corp.291 underscores these difficulties.
In Doe, the district court rejected the application of section
1441(c) to supplemental claims asserted in removal cases, even though
the legislative history stated that it would apply.292 It did, however,
284. No. 89-C4444, 1991 u.s. Dist. LEXIS 9243 (N.D. Ill. July 9, 1991).
285. 28 U.S.c. § 1338(b) (1988).
286. In another copyright case, the court relied on § 1367 to reach supplemental
claims based on state contract law. Pamfiloff v. Giant Records, Inc., No. C91-1708 RFP
(ENE), 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15887 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 1991). The judge did not address
the question whether § 1338(b) should be interpreted to bar all supplemental claims not
within that subsection.
287. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
288. Colgan v. Port Auth., No. 91-CVI136, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12610
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1991). In suits involving foreign sovereigns as plaintiffs, reliance on
§ 1367 could be dangerous since subsection (b) might be read to restrict supplemental jurisdiction in cases resting solely on § 1332 (a)(4).
289. E.g., Imperiale v. Hahnemann Univ., 776 F. Supp. 186 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Alexander v. Goldome Credit Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
290. See supra notes 189-220 and accompanying text.
291. 763 F. Supp. 1039 (E.D. Mo. 1991).
292. Id. at 1042-43; accord Di Loreto v. Di Loreto, No. 90-8126, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 10075 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1991).
In Doe, the court did not address the point that Congress could command the courts
to reinterpret the "separate and independent" language of section 1441(c) to cover supplemental claims. In Aleltander v. Goldome Credit Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D. Ala.
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rely on prior precedents and section 1367 as the sources of law for
asserting supplemental claims in removal cases. 293 Although amended
section 1441(c) appears to authorize a remand only of "all matters in
which state law predominates,"294 one court has interpreted the subsection to permit remand of the entire case, including the federal questions,295 and another to permit remand if the federal claim is
dismissed. 296
Fifth, one surprising impact has been the application of section
1367 to suits against states that assert Eleventh Amendment immunity.297 Under Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman,298
federal court plaintiffs may not, because of the Eleventh Amendment,
assert supplemental claims based on state law against a state defendant
or its agencies or officials. The original Wolf-Egnal proposal,299 submitted to Representative Kastenmeier, contained a provision that
would have overruled Halderman. 3OO Because some of the consultants
to Representative Kastenmeier's subcommittee raised constitutional
objections to that proposal, he did not include the provision in House
Bill 5381. The issue has arisen in a few cases under the new statute.
One court has exercised supplemental jurisdiction against a state
defendant because it read section 1367 as removing prior disabilities
under Aldinger v. Howard. 30l In Rosen v. Chang,302 the court held
that the plaintiff could assert a state claim against the State so long as
it has waived its sovereign immunity. Prior case law permitted suits
against state entities in federal trial courts, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment, if the State consents to suit in the federal court or if
Congress abrogates state sovereign immunity. If neither of these conditions obtains, however, section 1367 does not authorize supplemen1991), the court held that, although § 1441(c) is useless as a basis for supplementaljurisdiction, it did find a use for it in that case.
For a discussion of § 1441(c), as amended in 1990, see supra notes 209-20 and accompanying text.
293. Doe, 763 F. Supp. at 1041; accord Di Loreto v. Di Loreto, No. 90-8126, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10075 (E.D. Pa. July 19, 1991); Perkins v. City of Philadelphia, 766 F.
Supp. 313 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
294. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(c) (West Supp. 1991).
295. Alexander v. Goldome Credit Corp., 772 F. Supp. 1217 (M.D. Ala. 1991).
296. Imperiale v. Hahnemann Univ., 776 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
297. See generally CHEMERINSKY, supra note IS, ch. 7 (excellent discussion of the
Eleventh Amendment).
298. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
299. Hearings, supra note 75, at 686.
300. Id. at 687 (draft § 1367(b)(iv».
301. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). See discussion supra note 59 and accompanying text.
302. 758 F. Supp. 799 (D.R.I. 1991).

1992]

CODIFICATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION

49

tal claims against a state entity or official. 303
Sixth, a smattering of recent cases addresses a series of other
questions under section 1367. This Article earlier raised the question
whether the judges will state their reasons for dismissing supplemental
claims under section 1367(c). Generally, the courts have stated the
grounds, however briefly, upon which they have dismissed such
claims. 304 On occasion, however, a court has simply dismissed the
supplemental claim under section 1367(c) without reference to any
particular subparagraph. 305 Another issue raised earlier is the relationship between section 1367 and other provisions of federal law authorizing supplemental jurisdiction. 306 In two recent cases, this
question arose under the Copyright Act307 and under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. 308 In both instances, the courts held that these
statutes authorized the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. 309 In one
case,310 the judge declined to address the application of section 1367,
finding the other jurisdictional statute sufficient,311 while in the other
case,312 the court relied alternatively on section 1367. 313
CONCLUSION

The codification of supplemental jurisdiction was a necessary
congressional act in view of recent Supreme Court decisions that seriously diminished and threatened to undermine completely the doctrines of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. "Section 1367 not only
303. Ryan v. Cosentino, 776 F. Supp. 386 (N.D. Ill. 1991); cf. Blum v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., No. 90-2428-R, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4612 (D. Kan. March 5, 1991)
(diversity jurisdiction action).
304. E.g., Imperiale v. Hahnernann Univ., 776 F. Supp. 189 (E.D. Pa. 1991); Leyh v.
Property Clerk, 774 F. Supp. 742 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Mueller v. Cowen, No. 91-CI173, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13153 (N.D. III. Sept. 19, 1991); Nieves v. Santa Clara Land Title Co.,
No. C91-20286, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12550 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 1991).
305. E.g., Greene County Racing Comm'n v. City of Birmingham, 772 F. Supp.
1207 (N.D. Ala. 1991); Doe v. Douglas County School Dist., 770 F. Supp. 591, 594 (D.
Colo. 1991).
306. See supra notes 210-23.
307. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-119 (1988).
308. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602-1611 (1988).
309. Friedman v. Stacey Data Processing Serv., Inc., No. 89-C4444, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9243 (N.D. III. July 9, 1991) (copyright case); Colgan v. Port Auth., No. 91CVI136, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12610 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1991) (foreign sovereign immunities case).
310. Friedman v. Stacey Data Processing Serv., Inc., No. 89-C4444, 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9243 (N.D. III. July 9, 1991) (copyright case).
311. Id. at *12.
312. Colgan v. Port Auth., No. 91-CV1l36, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12610 (E.D.
N.Y. Aug. 14, 1991) (foreign sovereign immunities case).
313. Id. at *6-9.
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resurrects pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, it also makes great
strides in resolving much of the confusion surrounding the doctrines."314 The enactment provided the statutory basis for the assertion in federal court of claims that do not have an independent ground
of jurisdiction. If Congress had not acted, the absence of a statutory
basis for supplemental jurisdiction would have provided continued justification for further judicial erosion of the prior doctrines.
But the good work accomplished by the act of Congress codifying
supplemental jurisdiction may have been tainted by two key features
of section 1367: the broad power delegated to federal judges to entertain and dismiss supplemental claims, and the major exception provided in the statute for civil actions brought pursuant to section 1332
(largely diversity and alienage cases). The expansion of this exception
during the legislative process may have converted a "noncontroversial" measure into a controversial one.
For example, Professor Freer has sharply criticized the Congress
for enacting the supplemental jurisdiction provision without adequate
consideration, and without giving all concerned parties the opportunity to participate in its drafting and enactment. 3lS In addition, Congress has in recent years refused to abolish diversity jurisdiction
altogether. The exception for diversity cases in the new section 1367
could be viewed as an end run around past congressional refusal to
take the bigger step of repealing diversity jurisdiction.
The statute might very well be praised as "a model of successful
dialogue between the judicial and legislative branches."316 With the
exception of a few provisions here and there around the United States
Code, supplemental jurisdiction has largely been a product of judicial
creativity and ingenuity. The time had arrived when Congress had to
address the matter and place the doctrine on a firmer footing. If congressional authorization of federal court jurisdiction is accepted as the
controlling principle, then legislative action was absolutely required.
Needless to say, Congress rarely "gets it right" the first time it ventures forth into a relatively new field oflegislation. Thus, section 1367
might need some fine-tuning as the courts, through interpretation and
application, define its scope and impact. As Congress takes up the
314. Mouchawar, supra note 35, at 1613.
315. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity, supra note 9; Arthur
& Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws, supra note 226. See also John B. Oakley, Recent Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial Improvements
Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 V.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735,757-69 (1991).
316. Thomas M. Mengler et aI., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213, 216 (1991).
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more controversial recommendations in the report of the Federal
Courts Study Committee,317 it might wish to reevaluate aspects of section 1367.

317. See supra note 3.
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ApPENDIX A: 28 U.S.C. § 1367

§ 1367. Supplemental Jurisdiction
(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution. Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded solely on section 1332 of this title, the district
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a)
over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rule 14,
19,20, or 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by
persons proposed to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19 of such rules,
or seeking to intervene as plaintiffs under Rule 24 of such rules, when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,
(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or
claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,
(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it
has original jurisdiction, or
(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a), and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily
dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under
subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a
period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a
longer tolling period.
(e) As used in this section, the term "State" includes the District
of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or
possession of the United States.
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B: WOLF-EGNAL PROPOSAL

Supplemental Jurisdiction

*[(a) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, including an action removed from a State court, any party
may assert a non-federal claim against any person or other party if:
(i) the federal claim in the original complaint is not insubstantial; and
(ii) the original federal claim and the non-federal claim arise out of
the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences. If the original federal claim is founded solely on diversity of
citizenship, the original plaintiff may assert a non-federal claim only
against a party or person whom that plaintiff has not brought into the
civil action, unless the action was removed from a State court.]
*[(a) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction, including an action removed from a State court, any party
may assert a non-federal claim against any person or other party if:
(i) the federal claim in the original complaint is not insubstantial; and
(ii) the original federal claim and the non-federal claim are so related
that they constitute one case or controversy within the meaning of
Article III. If the original federal claim is founded solely on diversity
of citizenship, the original plaintiff may assert a non-federal claim only
against a party or person whom that plaintiff has not brought into the
civil action, unless the action was removed from a State court.]
(b) The district court may exercise supplemental jurisdiction
under subsection (a) even if: (i) the non-federal claim is asserted
against a person who is not already a party to the civil action; (ii) the
non-federal claim is the only claim asserted against a party or a person
to be brought into the civil action; (iii) the party or person asserting
the non-federal claim is an intervenor or an applicant for intervention;
or (iv) the party or person against whom the non-federal claim is asserted is a State, an agency of a State, or State officials.
(c) The district court shall, within 90 days of the commencement
of the action or assertion of the non-federal claim (whichever is later),
determine whether the non-federal claim should be dismissed. The
court shall dismiss or remand the non-federal claim if it is outside the
scope of subsection (a). The court may dismiss or remand the nonfederal claim if: (i) the federal claim is dismissed; or (ii) the non-federal claim substantially predominates over the federal claim; or
(iii) the non-federal claim should be tried separately. Upon entry of an
•

Alternative formulations for subsection (a).
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order dismissing the non-federal claim, the district court shall file with
the order a written statement of reasons for the dismissal.
(d) The period of limitations for any non-federal claim shall be
tolled while the claim is pending in the district court and for a period
of 30 days after it is dismissed under subsection (c) unless state law
provides for a longer tolling period.
(e) The district court may enter final judgment on the merits of
the non-federal claim if it is not dismissed under subsection (c), even
if, at the time of judgment, the federal claim has been dismissed.
(f) The district court, in determining the nature and scope of any
non-federal claim based on state law, shall freely utilize any certification procedures available for the determination of state law.
(g) As used in this section:
(i) "federal claim" means any claim that has an independent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in the district courts;
(ii) "non-federal claim" means any claim that does not have
an independent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in the district court;
(iii) "State" includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico;
(iv) "case" or "controversy" includes all claims, whatever
their legal sources, that: (A) arise out of the same transaction or
occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences; or (B) would
ordinarily be tried together in one judicial proceeding.
(h) This section supersedes any other provision of law unless
Congress otherwise expressly provides by statute.
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ApPENDIX C: H.R. 5381 SECTION 120
SEC. 120. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION.
(a) GRANT OF JURISDICTION.-Chapter 85 of title 28, United
States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following:

§ 1367. Supplemental jurisdiction
(a) IN GENERAL.-(I) In any civil action of which the district courts .have original jurisdiction, including an action removed from a State court, any party or person may assert a nonFederal claim against any person or other party if(A) the Federal claim in the original complaint is not
insubstantial; and
(B) the original Federal claim and the non-Federal
claim arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences.
(2) If the original Federal claim in a civil action is founded
solely on diversity of citizenship under section 1332, the original
plaintiff may assert a non-Federal claim under paragraph (1) only
against the original defendant or against a party or person who
has been brought into the action by a party or person other than
the plaintiff, unless the action was removed from a State court.
(b) SITUATIONS WHERE JURISDICTION MAY BE EXERCISED.-Except as provided in subsection (a)(2), the district court
may exercise supplemental jurisdiction under subsection (a) even
if.
(1) the non-Federal claim is asserted against a person
who is not already a party to the civil action;
(2) the non-Federal claim is the only claim asserted
against a party or a person to be brought into the civil action;
or
(3) the party or person asserting the non-Federal claim
is an intervenor or an applicant for intervention.
(c) DISMIsSAL OR REMAND.-If a non-Federal daim in an
action is asserted under subsection (a), the district court shall,
within 90 days after the commencement of the action or, if later,
within 90 days after the assertion of the non-Federal claim, determine whether the non-Federal claim should be dismissed or remandep. The court shall dismiss or remand the non-Federal
claim if it is not a permissible claim under subsection (a). The
court may dismiss or remand the non-Federal claim if(1) the Federal claim is ~ismissed;
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(2) the non-Federal claim substantially predominates
over the Federal claim; or
(3) the non-Federal claim should be tried separately.
Upon entry of an order dismissing or remanding the non-Federal
claim, the district court shall file with the order a written statement of the reasons for the dismissal or remand.
(d) TOLLING OF TIME LIMITATIONs.-The period of limitations for any non-Federal claim asserted under subsection (a)
shall be tolled while the claim is pending in Federal court and for
a period of 30 days after it is dismissed under subsection (c) unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.
(e) JUDGMENT ON NON-FEDERAL CLAIM EVEN IF FEDERAL CLAIM DISMISSED.-The district court may enter final judgment on the merits of the non-Federal claim if it is not dismissed
or remanded under subsection (c) even if, at the time of judgment,
the Federal claim has been dismissed.
(f) USE OF CERTIFICATION PROCEDURES To DETERMINE
STATE LAw.-The district court, in determining the nature and
scope of any non-Federal claim based on State law, shall use any
certification procedures available for the determination of State
law.
(g) DEFINITIONS.-As used in this section(1) the term "Federal claim" means any claim that has
an independent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in
the district courts;
(2) the term "non-Federal claim" means any claim that
does not have an independent, statutory basis for original jurisdiction in the district courts; and
(3) the term "State" includes the District of Columbia,
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.
(h) RELATIONSHIP To OTHER LAW.-This section supersedes any other provision of law except to the extent that a Federal statute expressly provides otherwise.
(b) CONFORMING AMENDMENT.-The table of sections at the beginning of chapter 85 of title 28, United States Code, is amended by
adding at the end the following new item:
1367. Supplemental jurisdiction.
(c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by this section
shall apply to civil actions commenced on or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
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Addendum: Section 1367 Supplemental Jurisdiction
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) and (c) or in another
section of this title, in any civil action on a claim for which the district
courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence or series of transactions or occurrences, including
claims that require the joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction under section 1332 of this title, the district courts shall not
have supplemental jurisdiction over claims by the plaintiff against persons joined under Rules 14 and 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons seeking to intervene under Rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the complete
diversity requirement of section 1332.
(c) The districts [sic] courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a
novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim under subsection (a)
predominates over the claim or claims for which the district court has
original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims for
which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) there are other appropriate
reasons, such as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the
litigants, for declining jurisdiction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) shall be tolled while the claim is pending in the district court
and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless state law provides for a longer tolling period.
(e) The word "States," as used in this section includes The Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico.
(f) This section supersedes any other provision of law except to
the extent that a federal statute expressly provides otherwise.
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Supplemental jurisdiction

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly
provided otherwise by federal statute, in any civil action of which the
district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to
claims within original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case
or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that involve the
joinder or intervention of additional parties.
(b) In any civil action of which the district courts have original
jurisdiction founded; solely on section 1332 of this title, the district
courts shall not have supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs against persons made parties under Rules 14, 19, 20, or 24 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or over claims by persons proposed
to be joined as plaintiffs under Rule 19, or seeking to intervene as
plaintiffs under Rule 24, of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, when
exercising supplemental jurisdiction over such claims would be inconsistent with the jurisdictional requirements of section 1332.
(c) The districts [sic] courts may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if (1) the claim raises a
novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim under subsection (a)
predominates over the claim or claims for which the district court has
original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims for
which it has original jurisdiction, or (4) there are other appropriate
reasons, such as judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the
litigants, for declining jurisdiction.
(d) The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30
days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling
period.
(e) The word "State," as used in this section includes the Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.

